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FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN APACHES,
1848-1886
By RALPH H. OGLE
CHAPTER I
THE APACHE AND HIS COUNTRY
THNOLOGISTS generally agree that the Apache Indians,
as members of the widely distributed Athapascan family, originated in the Yukon and Mackensie river valleys.
Why they broke away from the parent stock and wandered
far to the south will never be known, for their migration
occurred prior to the advent of the Caucasians. Since they
were evidently in search of a permanent habitat, they probably would have remained in the South Plains had not the
powerful Comanches driven them into the arid fastnesses
of the Southwest. But once in their new home, greater in
size than the New England States and New York combined,
they developed into one of the fiercest tribes in America;
and for more than three centuries successfully resisted
every Indian, Spanish 'l,nd Anglo-American effort to control
or displace them. 1 In fact, from 1540 to 1886 the Apaches
were the most important human element in retarding the
occupation and development of the Southwest. Their ability to impede the advance of the whites so effectively would
have been impossible had not the innate traits and severe.
physical environment of the tribe combined to develop a race
of unusual formidibleness. Thus, these complex factors
must be studied and analyzed if the three centuries of Apache
resistance are to be understood.

E

1. Rupert N. Richardson, The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement,
(Glendale, 1934), p. 53; Walter P. Webb, The Great Plains, (New York, 1931),
p. 116 passim.
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The Apache country---called Apacheria by the Spanish
-is a vast region. It roughly extends from near the Rio
Grande on the east to the Colorado on the west, and from the
San Francisco Mountains on the north to the heart of
Me~ican Chihuahua on the south. 2
Physiographically, this region is characterized in the
northern part by a southern protrusion of the Great Colorado Plateau, which has been dissected by erosive forces into
an intricacy of deep canyons and abrupt mesas. To the
south it is a land of rugged mountains, but the ranges
dwindle in size from north to south until they appear as
isolated ranges in the vicinity of the thirty-second parallel
and on into Mexico. The same phenomenon evinces itself
in the western part, and the characteristic isolated mountains stand sentinel-like well into the southern part of the
Great Basin. Near the southwestern New Mexico boundary,
the great- Cordilleran Range again rise,s into the rugged
Sierra Madre Mountains, thus forming some of the most
forbidding portions of Apacherfa. 3
From the somewhat alpine Colorado Plateau country
on the north to the low desert country in the south and
southwest, the intervening region consists of vast areas
that have been eroded into a labyrinth of the most tortuous
and intricate canyons, arroyos and mesas imaginable. A
great part of the region is composed of igneous rocks, principally lava which, when washed down upon level plains
or flood-plain districts, result in those desolate, forbidding
areas that the early adventurers called malpais. Where
flood-plains are deeply cut into by meandering rivers, terraced hills almost approaching canyon proportions are left
as banks. Nearly all hills and mesas are capped with layers
2. In connection see frontispiece map in Indian Population in· the U. S. and
Alaska, Bur. of the Census, (Wash., 1910). See also the U. S. Dept. of the Interior Map
of the Territory of the U. S., 1867. Another informative map is included in Annie H.
Abel. cd., The Official COTTespOndence of James S. Calhoun while Indian Agent at
Santa Fe, and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in New Mexico, (Wash., 1915).
3. Pacific Railroad Survey Reports: Reports of Explorations and Surveys to
Ascertain the Most Practicable Route for a Railroad from the Mississippi River to the
Pacific Ocean, 1853-1854, (Wash., 1855-1861), vol. iii, p. 42.
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of some volcanic formation which is generally so cut up
that travel over the 'resulting terrain is very hazardous.
Likewise, in regions of sedimentary strata, erosion has
gashed stupendous chasms that prove equally difficult for
travel and endeavor. 4
South of the Gila between the Rio Grande and the
Colorado, the region for about 150 miles in width is of the
most barren character. This area in New Mexico and to a
great degree in Arizona, has the appearance of a level desert
plain of sand and gravel, seamed here and there with short,
abrupt mountain ranges frequently connected by low lateral "divides." While not so rough and rugged as the
northern area, this region is so cut up by arroyos and ravines
of moderate depth, that campaigning against Indians was
of the utmost difficulty. The Apaches easily escaped detection in such a region and with equal facility' they arranged
ambuscades. If too closely pressed they took refuge in one
of the convenient ranges, where "you could as well catch a
wild chamois."5
_ Climatically, the Apache country is a land of contrasts.
In those parts of high altitude swift streams gave the
Apaches a plentiful supply of water at all seasons. But
frequently extensive areas between mountains were so
effectively screened against humid air that deserts resulted
in the midst of a region of fair rainfall. Naturally, the
Apaches solved the difficulty by attaining a minuteknowledge of all water holes, "tanks" and springs. Copious
streams as they pushed down into the desert lowlands diminished in size and finally disappeared entirely in the sandy
4, Journal of Capt. A. R. Johnson, in W. H. Emory, Notes of a Military Reconnaissance from Fort Leavenworth. in Missouri. to San Diego, California, Including
Parts of the Arkansas, Del Norte, and Gila Rivers, 1846-1847, 30 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D.
no. 41, p. 590; Pac. Railroad Reports, vol. ii, P. 13; Robert Frazer, Apaches of the
White Mountains, (Phila., 1885), p. 4.
5. Lt. Sylvester Mowry to J .. W. Denver, Nov. 10, 1857, 35 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D.
no. 2, vol. ii, p. 584; Gen. Irvin McDowell to A. A. G., Mar: 23, 1866, 1. O.
Miscellaneous Files; J. R. Bartlett, Personal Narrative of Explorations and Incidents
in Texas, Ne'w Mexico, California, Sonora, and Chihuahua. connected with the United
States and Mexican Boundary Commission, During the Years 1850, 1851, 185l!, and
1858, (New York, 1854), vol. i, p. 365, vol. ii, Pp. 567-568. See also W. H. Bishop;
"'Across Arizona," in Harper's New Magazine, vol. lvi, p. 389.
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wastes of their beds. The Indians and experienced frontiersmen obtained. water, however, by digging down into
the chann(:lls until the underground flow was reached. 6
What rains fell in the low resert regions were usually
of torrential proportions that washed out a myriad of small
channels and gullies. . These physiographic features gave
the unencumbered Apaches an extreme advantage over the
slow moving impedimenta-laden military.
In flattened
areas excess waters collected and later evaporated, leaving
desolate alkali playas. These dusty, unvegetative plains
were special barriers to successful troop movements. 7
The Apache country with its high mountains and low
desert plains naturally had a wide variation in temperature.
An Apache runner could travel in less than two days from
an extensive region of alpine coolness to the burning lowlands of tropical heat. Temperatures over. most of the area·
had a daily range of thirty to fifty degrees, those in the
low altitudes standing for months at 100·_120·. What
effects these extremes and wide variations had on the
Apaches'
bodies and
minds are merely conjectural. It is
.
.
probable, however, that the extraordinary stamina and
ferocity characteristic of the Apaches, were sharply accentuated by these stimulating factors. s
The word "Apache," which is probably of Spanish or
6. Col. B. L. Bonneville to A. G:, July 15, IS59, 36 Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no 2,
vol. ii, Pp. 301-302; A. F. Bandelier, Fi1Ul,1 Report of Investigations Among the Indians
of the Southwestern ·States, Carried on Mainly in the Years 1880-1885. (Papers of the
Archaeological Institute of America. American Series no. 3, Cambridge, 1890). pt. i,
p. 17.
7. Julius Froebel, Seven Years Travel in Central America, Northern Me",ico and
the Far West of the United States, (London, 1859). p. 482; Emory, Notes of a Mi1.itary
Recon1Ul,issance, p. 63; Pac. Rai1.road Reports, vol. vii, p. 30; Woodworth Clum, Apache
Agent: The Story of John P. Clum, (New York, 1936), pp. 207-209.
8. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 21, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1. vol. ii,
p. 73; Elie Reclus, Primitive Folic: Studies in Comparative Ethnological Life, (New
York. 1891), pp. 123-124; Bandelier, op. cit., pp. 15.17, 21. Crook shows ("The Apache
Problem," in Jour1Ul,1 of the Military Service Institution of the U';ited States, vol. viii.
p .. 266) how the winter climate of the Great Plains worked for peace with the Plains
tribes, and how the winter climate of the Southwest left the Apa~hes practically unhampered.
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Mexican origin,9 is the name most commonly applied to the'
fierce and barbarian people who roamed over the territory
just described. The word may have been taken from the
Yuman term e-patch, generally interpreted to mean "man"10
or, as applied to the Apache-Yuma and Apache-Mohave, to
mean "fighting man."ll The word could also have been
derived from the Zuni word "Apachu," which is understood
to convey the meaning of "enemy." In actual practice the
early Spaniards did call the Navaho kinsmen of the Apaches
the Apaches de Nabaju. 12 Singularly, the Apaches, who do
not understand the word "Apache," call themselves the
Tinneh or some of its variants, as Dine, Tinde,' or Inde,
which mean '''man'' or people."13
It has already been stated that the Apaches migrated
from the Yukon and Mackensie river valleys before the
coming of European explorers. No exact evidence is avail. able regarding their movement, but their present location as
well as certain linguistic changes logically indicate that they
broke away from their northern kinsmen at an early
period. 14 Ethnologists, however, are quite divergent and
indefinite in their views concerning the time, reasons and
routes of the Apache migration to the Southwest.
Wissler thinks that as raiders the Apaches might have
gradually worked southward, and by the time of the Spanish
9. Frederick W. Hodge in Bulletin 90 of the Bureau of American Ethnology.
Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico, (Washington, 1907), pt. i, p. 63.
This work in two volumes, edited by Hodge, will be cited bereafter as Handbook.
Cf. also John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook (New York, 1890, p. 113.
10. Frederick W. Hodge, "The Early Navaho and Apache," in American
Anthropologist, vol. viii, p. 233.
11. Frederick W. Hodge, "Early Western History," in Land of Sumhine.
vol. xiii, p. 442. This material is in tbe form of annotations to the translations by
Mrs. Edward E. Ayer .of Benavides' and other early writers' works.
12. Handbook, pt. i, p. 63.
13. "Notes on the Cosmogony and Theogony of the Mohave Indians of the
Rio Colorado, Arizona," in the Journal of American Folk Lore, vol. ii, pp. 181-182;
Bourke, op. cit. Dr. John P. Harrington of the Bureau of American Ethnology says
Tinnedh is the correct form of spelling. Harrington to the writer, Nov. 15, 1935.
14. A. M. Tozzer, "Notes on the Religious Ceremonials of the Navaho," in
Putnam Anniversary Volume, Anthropological Essays (New York, 1909), p. 300;
For 8 technical discussion of the interrelation of the Tinneah see, A. G. Morice.
"Unity of Speech Among the Northern and the Southern Dine," in Amer. Anthrop.•
vol. ix, pp. 720·727.
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explorations, they had been in their new habitat long enough
to learn pottery making, basket weaving and primitive
agriculture. Their mode of life, he also believes, had already
reached a stage more complex than that necessitated by the
chase alone. 15 Harrington produces evidence that they may
have moved into the Pacific Northwest long ago. From
here, in quest of a warmer climate, they possibly pushed on
into the Great Basin where, driven by the Utes and other
Shoshonean tribes towards Arizona and New Mexico, they
at last took up their abode' in the uninhabitated White
Mountains country.16 Hodge, more definitely, states that
a large band came from the south in 1560 and joined the
Navahos. They remained, he believes, unimportant until
1650, -occupying a very limited and indeterminable area,
but, by steady growth during the succeeding few decades,
their' importance increased with their numbers, and their
aggressiveness with bothP
The Apaches in their migrations developed no distinct
culture; but, receptive to extraneous ideas and modes of
life, they absorbed without change many cultural elements
possessed by the tribes found in the regions through which
they passed. This would indicate that they left a culture
15.
16.

83,

5.

Clark Wissler, "The Apache Indian," in The Target, vol. lxxxiii, no.
p.
Dr. Harrington in
had several conferences on the subject of Apache
migrations with the late Professor P. E. Goddard of the University of California.
Goddard held the same views as Harrington. Harrington also agrees .that the
Apaches may have migrated south along the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains
to' the southern plains. From here after an extended period they were possibly
forced into their present habitat by the more populous plains tribes. Harrington to
the writer, Nov.
17. Hodge, "The Early Navaho and Apache," loco cit., p. 227.
The first Spanish reference to the Apaches was made by Juan de Onate in
when he reported them as living in the "Snowy Mountains" of New Mexico. This location was probably not more than seventy-five miles north of the San Juan home of the
Navahos; and not in the White Mountain section-the despoblado, or uninhabited
region as Coronado's chroniclers aptly termed it. If any Apaches lived to the south
in the sixteenth century, they Were near the headwaters of the Gila, where, if
Benavides' later account is to be accepted, their use of dog sledges definitely indicated
their plains' heritage. J. G. Bourke, -'Notes and News," in Amer. Anthrop., vol. viii,
p.
See also, Hodge, loco cit., for quotations from Onate, Obediencia y Vassalaje de
San Juan Bautista,
in Doc. Ined. de Indias, vol. xvi, p.
Niza, Coronado and Jaramillo left nothing definite to prove that any Apaches
inhabited the region between the Gila and Cibola in
Ibid., P.

1918

15, 1935.

1598

289.

1598,

114.

1539-1540.

228.
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marked by no special positive original traits. 18 As an intrusive people they merely appear to have first pushed into
plains groups and finally into advanced groups of sedentary
people-the Hopis and Pimas. 19 What culture they have is
therefore a composite of Plains and Pueblo. 20 HOJVever,
Bandelier maintains that once in the Southwest no other
tribe exercised such a powerful influence on the fate of its
inhabitants as have the Apaches. He thinks they completely
changed the ethnography of the region. 21
The Apache tribe was divided into a number of tribal
groups or parts, but they have not been united at any time
since the period of American occupatio!!. The main divisions remained on friendly terms with one another; occasionally two or more of them cooperated in difficult underThere was considerable intermarriage among
takings.
them, they had no distinct boundary lines between their
several ranges, and in many respects they were more closely
related than separate tribes would be. They simply segregated, as the tribe grew, into distinct groups for purposes
of more effective marauding. Later, they became known by
the names of the country forming their respective ranges:
Pinalefio, Sierra Blanca, Chiricahua, Gilefio, etc., or from
some habit or mental characteristic as reflected in the names
Tonto and Coyotero. 22 •
The easternmost group 23 were the Mimbrefios. Their
principal place of abode was the Mimbres Mountains, but
they also lived in many other sections of the region between
the Rio Grande and the Rio San Francisco. They roamed
18. Tozzer, op. cit.
19.. J. W. Fewkes, "Tusayan Migration Traditions." in Nineteenth Annual
Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, (Wash., 1900), PP. 580-581; Cosmos
Mindeleff, "Aboriginal Remains in the Verde Valley," in Thirteenth Annual Report
of the Bureau of American Ethnology, (Wash., 1896), p. 260.
20. Tozzer, Ope cit.
21. Bandelier, Final Report, pt. i. pp. 182-183. See his discussion of Indian
migrations, ibid., p. 26 et seq.
22. J. G. Bourke, "Notes upon the Gentile Organization of the Apaches of
Arizona," in Journal of the American Folk-Lore Society, vol. iii, PP. 111-126. For
an Apache's discussion of the different divisions. see Geronimo's Story of His Life.
edited by S. M. Barrett (New York, 1906), pp. 12-14.
23. Only those groups coming within the scope of this study will be considered.
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widely on both sides of the Rio Grande and into Coahuila,
Mexico, as well as into the White Mountains of Arizona.
Som~ writers call them the Copper Mine Apaches and others
identify them as a branch of the Gilefios. 24 The Mexicans
who were issuing rations to them at Janos in 1850 estimated
their warrior strength to be 200. 25 During the following
twenty years their total number was estimated to vary
from 400-7.50. 26
A centrally located Apache group were the Coyoteros
or "wolfmen," so named because they ate coyotes, or
probably because they roamed about extensively. They
subsisted mainly on the products secured by agriculture
or the hunt, although some observers reported them to be
more agricultural than any of their neighbors and to have
less need for theft because of their stockraising. 27 This
division was geographically separated into the Pinal and
White Mountain Coyoteros. They ranged throughout Arizona and western New Mexico. When not roaming they
stayed in the mountain regions from which they derived
their names, and from these fastnesses they were said to
act in concert with the predatory Tontos. 28 Their early
numbers are unknown.
24. The Memorial of FrfkY Alonzo de Benfkvides, 1630, (Chicago, 1916), footnote
43, p. 265. This work was translated by Mrs. Edward E. Ayer and annoted by F. W.
Hodge and C. F. Lummis.
25. Bartlett, Personfkl Nfkrrfktive, vol. i, pp. 323-324.
26. J. L. Collins to J. W. Denver, Aug. 30. 1857, 35 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D.,
no. 2, vol. ii. P. 564; Hfkoobook, pt. i, p. 863. A subdivision of the Apaches once
called Mogollones, ranged over the Mogollon region of New Mexico and Arizona.
Associated with the Mimbreiios, they are no longer officially recognized as Mogollones. In 1857 the Indian Bureau estimated them at 900-1300. Ibid., p. 919. For an
early account of the ranges of the Apaches, see report of Don Jose Cortez dated 1799,
in A. W. Whipple, "Report Upon the Indian Tribes of Arizona and New Mexico,"
Pacific Railroad Survey Reports, (Wash., 1856), vol. iii, pt. Ill, pp. 118-120.
27. Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, or the Journal of fk Santa Fe Trader,
(New York, 1845), vol. i, P. 290; "Yuma" to Sylvester Mowry, ·Dec. 25, 1859,
·United States Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, General Files,
Arizona, M 169. Hereafter files of this class will be designated by 1. O. (Indian
Office) ,. followed by their respective file numbers. Those of other territories will be
. kept distinct. Cf. also Wbipple, op. cit., p. 120.
28. M. T. McMahon to C. E. Mix, Dec. 15, 1860, 1. 0., Indian Division Files,
M. 416. At one time the Indian Office had an Indian Division which dealt with
Indian administrative matters handled by the Secretary of the Interior himself.
Hereafter such files will be designated 1. D., and followed by the.respective file number.
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The Tonto 29 group appears to have been a heterogene. ous body of Yavapai, Yuma and Mohave with some Pinalefio
Apache included. Nineteenth century writers applied the
term to practically all the Indians roaming between the
White Mountains and the Rio Colorado. 30 Many of the
Yavapai in the group selected wives from the Pinal Coyoteros. Uniquely, those bands living in: the Tonto Basin were so
isolated that they had the characteristics of a distinct group,
and they developed a dialectic difference not easily understood by the other Apaches. 31 The first scientist t9 observe
the Tontos reported that they had always lived near the
junction of the Verde and Salt rivers, fighting Pimas and
raiding into Sonora, until the establishment of Fort McDowell at that point in 1865. Then, he said, they retired eastward to the canyons northeast of Four Peaks where the
army so harrassed them that they were unable to take up a
permanent abode. 32 They were low in the scale of humanity
and relatively harmless according to the second scientific
report concerning them. 33
An Apache group important in governmental relations,
but insignificant in numbers was the Arivaipa. Their name
meant "girls" and likely indicated the performance of some
unmanly act. They lived south of the Gila in several rancherias located in the Arivaipa Canyon. Although they were
somewhat agricultural, they raided far southward and were
reputed to have laid waste many towns in northern Mexico
prior to the Gadsden Purchase. Only a few hundred in number, the Arivaipa were credited with the extermination of
29. "Tonto" means stupid or foolish. Other Apaches created the name because
the Tontos spoke so barbarously. Bourke, "Notes and News," loco cit., P. 293.
30. Handbook, pt. ii, p. 783.
31. P. E. Goddard, "Indians of the Southwest," Handbook Series, no. 2, American
Museum of Natural History, (New York, 1913), p. 130.
32. Dr. Charles Smart, "Notes on the Tonto Apaches," Annual RePOTt for 1867,
Smithsonian Institution, (Wash., 1872), p. 417. There were possibly 2000 of them in
1866. See Smart's ma. no. 181, Bur. of Ethnology. Hereafter the Bureau of Ethnology will generaly be designated B. E.
33. Dr. John B. White to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Aug. 31, 1874, I. 0.,
R 620. Hereafter the Commissioner of Indian Affairs will be designated as Commissioner or Comm.
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the Sobaipuri Pimas in the late eighteenth century. Their
association with the Pinaleflos was very close. 34
Another group of great historical importance was the
Yavapai or Apache-Mohave. These ethnologically complex
"eastern people" or "people of the sun" were not different
from their kinsmen, the Yumas and Mohaves, except that
they lived a nomadic life in the mountains of west-central
Arizona, instead of a sedentary one along the Colorado.
Their language differed from that of the Apaches, but their
customs, habits, and especially their hostility to the whites
were sufficient to class them as Apaches. Their Yuman
blood endowed them with a strong physique and an utter
lack of feeling, while Apache contact taught them alertness
and activity.35 Estimated at 2000-2500 souls in 1863, they
were more definitely established as a group of 1000 in 1873.36
One other group of unknown numbers in the pre-reservation period, and perhaps the most widely known Indians
of North America, were the "Great Mountain" or Chiricahuas. 37 They furnished many noted warchiefs and as aboriginal diplomats were unexcelled; Their country closely
approximated the extreme part of southeastern Arizona, but
under their succession of able chieftains, they carried their
forays through a great part of New Mexico, Arizona, and
34. "Yuma" to Mowry, Dec. 25, 1859, op. cit.; Handbook,. pt. i, p. 87. Hodge in
indicating that: the Arivaipa "laid waste every town in n. M.exico as far as the Gila
prior to the Gadsden purchase in 1853" probably
means that the raids were
.
, south from
the Gila rather than north to the same.
The term Gila Apaches, or Gilefios has at various times been applied to nearly all
the bands living along the Gila. There were about 4000 Indians so designated in 1853.
The name is now obsolete. Ibid., p. 492.
35. E. S. Curtis, The North American Indian, (Cambridge, 1907), vol. i, p. 105;
Bourke, "Notes Upon the Gentile Organization. . . " loco cit., p. 113; Handbook, pt. ii,
p.994.
36. C. D. Poston to W. P. Dole, April I, 1863, 38 Cong.. 1 sess., H., E. D. no. I,
vol. iii, p. 123; T. E. Farish, History of Arizona, (San Francisco, 1915), vol. vii, p.
231. This work will be cited hereafter as Farish.
Bourke identified the Apache-Yumas as almost identical with Yavapai. Bourke,
op. cit. They were probably more closely allied with the Yumas and less with the
Tontos than the Yavapai were. See Handbook under Tulkepaia, pt. ii, p. 836.
37. Associated with the Chiricahuas were the Pinalenos or "Pinery People!'
Their home was in the Pinaleiios and Pinal Mountains of Arizona. Writers often
confused them with the Pinal Coyoteros. Benavides' Memorial, footnote no. 43, PP.
260-261. See also Handbook, pt. i, p. 255, pt. ii, pp. 282, 284.
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northern Mexico, even spreading terror and dismay to the
very gates of Durango. 3s Given security by geographical
environment and endowed with insatiable warlike propensities, they dotted their entire range with the graves of their
victims. 39
,There are many estimates of the population of the
Apaches. Usually, the early observers included the eastern
groups in their figures. 40 Benavides~ thought there were
more Apaches than all the other people of New Spain,41 while
Catlin over two centuries later estimated them at 30,000.
persons.42 Even Cremony, in their midst during the 1860's,
estimated them at 25,000 souls. 43 Engineers and explorers
modestly placed their numhers at 5,000-7,000.44 The latter
figures, more in conformity with those recorded in reservation days, doubtless, approximate closely the actual early
numbers of the Western groups.
Ethnologically, the. Apaches appear to have been a
varied group, their numbers having been augmented by captives taken from neighboring tribes as well as from the settlements of northern Mexico. Hrdlicka says, however, that
they were a clearly defined physical type of "remarkable
homogeneity." 45
The Apaches in physique were below average, being
about five feet five inches in height and weighing 140-150
pounds. Nevertheless, they satisfied every requirement for
a robust and healthy race. With broad, deep and full chests,
38. Patrick Hamilton; The Resources of Arizona, (San Francisco, 1884), p. 293.
39.
"Yuma" to Mowry, Dec. 25, 1859, op. cit.
40. For the eastern groups Bee Handbook, pp. 63-67; Carl Coke Rister, The
SouthwesteTn Frontier, 1865-1881, (Cleveland, 1928), pp. 33-35; Rupert N. Richardson. The Comanche Barrier, p.
See also Richardson and RiBter, The Greater Southwest, (Glendale, 1934), chap. i.
41. Hodge, "Early Western History," loco cit., p. 438.
42. George Catlin, Last Ramble among the Indians, (London, n. d.), p. 180.
Catlin never saw a war party of more than 300 braves; nevertheless, he reported a
total of 8000 warriors.
43. John C. Cremony, Life among the Apaches, (New York. 1868), p. 142.
44. Pac. Railroad Reports, vol. ii, p. 14; Bartlett, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 385.
45. Ales Hrdlicka, Physiological and Medical Observations among the Indians of
the Southwestern United States and Northern Mexico, Bulletin 34, B. E., (Wash.,
1908), pp. 8-9. See also Hrdlicka, "Stature of Indians of the Southwest and Northern
Mexico," in Putnam Anniversary Volume, pp. 411-412.

52.
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straight shoulders, well proportioned limbs, strong and muscular, they were products of their environment. 46 They had
high cheek bones, very broad faces and Roman noses, with
firm set, rather large under jaws. Their outer ears were
pitched more forward and set straighter up and down than
were those of the whites. In color they varied from dark to
light mahogany. Their well-shaped heads looked enormously large because of the even coat of thick mane-like
hair which covered themP The women, though generally
several inches shorter than the men, were better specimens
physically. The younger women possessed regular,' clear
cut features, large, liquid,' brown eyes, and clear, smooth
skin embellished with a mass of long shining, black hair.
These attractiv£! personal characteristics, further enhanced
by slender figures that terminated in shapely limbs and
small feet, caused early commentators to describe Apache
maidens as individuals of unusual beauty.48
The strength, endurance and stamina of the Apaches
were a source of amazement to those whites who knew the
Indians well. Their lung power was remarkable, and they
were swift and tireless at climbing mountains or making
long marches. "Ninety miles by trail in thirteen hours was
nothing unusual for the Apache runner," and on the side of
a mountain they could outrun a horse. 49
Physical pain and suffering could be borne to a great
degree. The Apaches could race through cacti that would
cover a horse or mule with blood; also, they have been known
to endure temperatures down to twenty to forty below zero,
dressed in nothing but a breech-cloth.50 Individuals were
46. Dr. J. B. White, ms. no. 179, B. E., p. 21; J. G. Bourke, An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre: An Account of the Expedition in Pursuit of the Hostile
Chiricahuas in the Spring of 1883, (New York, 1886), PP. 22-23.
47. Pac. Railroad Reports, vol. iii, pp. 97-99; Dr. W. H. Corbusier, "The ApacheYumas and Apache-Mohaves," in American Antiquarian, (reprint) Sept., 1886, pp.
3-5.

48.

1925),

89;

O. L. Hein, Memories of Long Ago, (New York,
p.
Arizona Miner
(Prescott), Mar.
White, op. cit.
E. D. Tussey, "The Apache Wars in Arizona, mH., University of Iowa, 1926,
p.
N. S. Higgins, mH. no.
B. E.,
p.
Reclus, Primitive Folk, p.
Cremony, op. cit., PP.

49.
8;
50.

9, 1872;

180,
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seldom killed outright. Higgins knew of a buck who, before
he fell, ran three hundred yards through bushes which tore
off parts of the viscera that protruded from an abdominal
wound. He also knew of another one that, though seriously wounded eight times, kept on the warpath until he
was hanged at Apache Pass in 1862. 51 General Crook looked
upon them as an embodiment of physical endurance, resembling "as little the well-fed Indian of the eastern reservations, as does the hungry wolf the sleek house dog."52
Violence .and disease, notwithstanding, decimated the
Apaches despite their physical hardihood. 53 Opinions vary
regarding infant mortality. Those officials concerned with
the military control of the tribes, saw only the strong and
perfectly developed children surviving, while those in civil
control found infant mortality slight, and an increasing
birthrate. U4 When they were herded on reservations, individuals of all ages were plag1,led by diseases of sedentary
life. Respiratory troubles, eye diseases, fevers and digestive
troubles took a heavy toll. Closer contact with the whites
induced smallpox and venereal maladies. Mysteriously,
meningitis frequently attacked the children. Among the
adults the dissipation incident to excessive drinking, exposure while drunk, lack of sanitation and sleepless nights
at medicine ceremonies broke them down physically and
made the inroads of disease easy; furthermore, their medicinal practices spread the scourges instead of curing them. 55
Dr. White found that the Apaches matured early, died relatively young and seldom lived to be grandparents.. But Dr.
Charles Henry reported to Schoolcraft that many were cen20.
200-260

61. Higgins. op. cit.• p.
The women frequently carried for long distance.
loaded baskets weighing
pounds. White, op. cit.• p. 48. .
Gen. George Crook, "The Apache Problem.... loco cit.• PP.
Hrdlicka found among the southwestern tribes, except in the case of the
Apaches. an excess of males over females. Their exception. he felt. was due to violent
deaths resulting from their continuous wars and raids. Hrdlicka, op. cit., p. 38.
Reclus. op. cit., p.
Clum, Apache Agent, p.
A. B. Reagan, "Notes On the Indians of the Fort Apache Regions," Anthropological Papers of the Museum of Natural History. (New York,
vol. xxxi, pt.
v, p. 314.
.

62.
63.

64.
55.

135;

261-262.

95. 144.
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tenarians and that the old men were extraordinarly wellpreserved. 56
The Apaches from the psychical standpoint are difficult
to estimate. This is due to the differences in the views of
the whites and the reds. The settlers and military generally
looked upon them as little above the gruesome forms of animal life that infested the same habitat. But when the
whites called them cowards, perhaps the Apaches in their
own estimation were exercising the greatest courage. Bourke
declared them entitled to rank among the bravest, and Crook
said they knew their rights 'and were not afraid to maintain them. 57 When mortally wounded or when escape was
impossible they would fight until death. Boys were as courageous as adults and the women often exhibited more real
courage than the warriors. 58
In aboriginal duplicity, diplomacy and woodcraft, the
Apaches' resistance to control was further increased. Bandelier found them to be quick of perception with a practical
turn of mind, and cunning rather than bright. 59 Their
hea.ring, vision and imitativeness were cultivated to perfection. Their knowledge of camouflage proved that they
had a perfect understanding of the assimilation of colors. GO
56. Henry R. Schoolcraft, Information Respecting the HistOT1/, Condition, and
Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States, (New York, 1855), vol. v, P. 208.
Dr. White's observations in the years 1873-1875 were made at a time when
very
great proportion of the older people had undoubtedly suffered violent deaths incident
to military activity, or had succumbed to the vicissitudes resulting from it. Out of
every 1000 Indians, he reported 146 husbands, 156 wives, 110 bachelors and widowers,
126 spinsters and widows, 226 boys under 13 and 236 girls under 13. White, op. cit.

a

p.23.
57. Bourke, An Apache Campaign, pp. 34-35; Crook to Herbert Welch, July 16,
1884, in Indian Rights Association Publications, 1st series, (Phila., 1884).
.
58. Bartlett, op. cit., vol. i, p. 454; Cremony, op. cit.,' P. 142.
Young army officers frequently accused Apache military scouts of being cowardly
because the scouts preferred stealth and adroitness to close combat. Hand to hand
fighting did terrorize the warriors, for being imaginative the effect of disaster was
not measured by actual loss and suffering, but by the source, shape and suddenness
of it. Lt. G. O. Eaton to Post Adjutant (Camp Verde), Nov. 7. 1874, United States
Department of War, Adjutant General's Office, Old Files Section, Executive Division,
no. 5254. Hereafter files of this class will be designated A. G. 0., followed by their
respective file numbers. See also Francis A. Walker. The Indian Question (Boston"
1874), p. 46.
59. Bandelier, op. cit.• p. 259.
60. Higgins, op. cit. Ceremony gives this subject much attention. Cf. his Life
among the Apaches, pp. 189, 290 0 291.
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All this native ability was used in war and the chase.
The Apaches' idea of war was to keep a general feeling of
insecurity for life and property among their victims, striking them only when there could be no retaliation. 61 They
surveyed the terrain along the trails with a rapidity and a
thoroughness astounding to Caucasians. Their knowledge
of the topography of the country over which they ranged
was almost perfect. Besides, they knew expertly how to
utilize both the plant and animal resources of the area.
These factors allowed the bands to maintain their existence
under the most trying conditions. 62
The most important element in Apache resistance to
military control was perhaps their effective use of signs and
signals and their ability to communicate over long distances.
Parties on the trail left stones and sticks so arranged as to
show numbers, purposes, results of undertakings and the
necessity of assistance. Intruders into the Apache range left
the facts concerning their numbers, character and time of
their passing by the nature and condition of the grass that
they had pressed down, and by the ordure of their mounts. 63
Intelligence was communicated to all parts of Apacp.eria in
twenty-four hours through the use of smoke signals by day
and fire flashes at night. Such effective communication
allowed the small detached bands, which the unreliability
of natural subsistence necessitated, to operate in unusual
concert, and with remarkable formidableness to maintain
control over the vast region they inhabited. 64 .
Hostile Apaches were extraordinarly difficult to apprehend. If pursued their courses led over terrain that left no
trails and through regions where surprise or capture was a
61. Lt. A. G. Hennise to Wm. Clayton, Aug. 31, 1870, 41 Cong.• 3 sess., H. E. D.
no. I, vol. i. p. 624; The Weekly Arizonian (Tucson), July 24, 1869.
62. Bourke. op. cit., p. 35; White. op. cit., p. 46.
63. Lt. S. W. Fountain to A. G., Dec. 12. 1885" 1. 0., 3205. After 1880 all 'communicati~ns received at the Indian Office were filed serially by number.
See also
Cremony, op. cit.• pp. 184-186.
'
64. Information concerning the movements of troops was "smoked through" for
distances of 300 miles in 2-3 hours. Military couriers 5-6 days later would confinn the
correctness of the Indians' messages. Farish, vol. iv, p. 79.
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mere accident. They avoided all water holes, going easily a
hundred miles without halting; their drinking water was
carried along in the intestines.of animals killed by the way.
Attacks were made at moments when their enemies felt
most secure. Then the Apaches scattered like wolves to
rendezvous again at some distant spot known only· to themselves. To experienced army officers they were the fiercest
and most redoubtable of all the warlike Indians. 65
The Apaches as diplomats were good talkers and not
readily deceived. Probably equaling the Iroquois in the
maxim of "divide and rule," they took good care to be at
peace with some of their sedentary neighbors while devastating others. They once tried to burn San Xavier when
3,000 friendly Apaches were camped close to Tucson. They
commonly. sold at EI Paso the plunder taken from Sonora,
and certain Mexican towns were always courted so that
troop movementscould be ascertained. Even as late as 1886,
Nacori and Becodeguachi were exempt from devastations
for this reason. 66
Partisan views made an analysis of the Apache moral
life very difficult. A fair estimate is therefore impossible
because Apache standards differed so widely from those of
their observers. . Most frontiersmen naturally vilified the
Indians as "murderers by descent and thieves by prescription." 67
The whites considered the Apaches a treacherous race,
but the tribesmen in training their children from birth to
regard all other people as natural enemies made- treachery a
prime virtue. The chief excellence of a warrior was to outwit his enemies in order that the highest honors could be
bestowed upon him because of his rascality; therefore, even
the charge of intertribal treachery loses its force, for each
65. Crook to Ao A. Go, Sept. 21, 1872, 42 Congo, 3 8ess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii,
p. 78; Crook to Welch, July 16, 1884, opo cit.; Crook to A. G., Jan. 11, 1886, 1. 0.,
Land Div., 4584.
66. Bourke, "Notes and New8," op. cito, p. 288; W. Turner, "The Fearle88
Apaches," in National Republic, vol. xvi, p. 39.
67. Journals of the First (Pre8cott, 1864) Legislative Assembly, po 430
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band was strictly independent of all other bands. 68 Thieves
were more esteemed than brave men, especially by Apache
debutantes, yet theft within the band was frowned upon as
the worst of crimes. Deceit was regarded with the greatest
admiration. To take advantage of a credulous enemy was
a splendid stroke of policy. Justice and revenge were
synonymous ideas, and the next comer was held strictly
responsible for the acts and intentions of his predecessors. 69
Naturally, the Apaches were a cruel race, representing
as they did generations steeled in fighting against enemies
"as cruel and revengeful" as they themselves. 70 Taught in
their childhood how to inflict heinous punishment on captive
birds and animals, they later, as adults, practiced it on their
human victims by roasting their heads over slow fires, by
cutting off piecemeal the less vital parts of their bodies and
by the final crushing of their heads. 71
What differences of culture on~ finds among the Western Apaches and other aboriginal Americans are essentially
due to geographical determiniam. The Apaches were strictly
products of their particular environment. Their ability to
live off their region was expressed by a very old Apache who
said, "There is food everywhere if one only knows how to
68. M. T. McMahan to C. E. Mix, Dec. 15, 1860, 1. D., M 416; H. H. Bancroft,
History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1590-1888. (San Francisco, 1889), p. 552;
Froebel, Seven Years Travel, p. 489. Intertribal looseness benefitted the United
States at a later time, for had General Crook been unsuccessful in inducing the
bands to fight against each other. the tribe would have been almost unconquerable.
Tussey, op. cit., p. 17.
69. Cremony, op. cit., pp. 72, 86.
70. Crook, loe. cit., vol. viii. p. 261.
71. Prescott Miner, July I, 1871; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 18, 1881. Some superstitious idea about' the body must have caused the habitual crushing of heads. After
firearms became common, a bullet was always fired through the heads. Certain types
of mutilations were committed out of high respect for the victims. When an enemy's
heart was cut out and eaten, it was done so the courage of the victim would be trans..
mitted to the victors. The stirrup foot and the right hand were skinned as a mark of
respect to a foe who sold his life dearly. Scalping (seldom practiced) and disfiguring
were restricted to those who had fought for their lives. Arizona Miner, Nov. 18,
1875; Farrish, vol. v, p. 289; Geronimo's Story, pp. 54, 60. .
The Apaches were not devoid of higher feelings and emotions, and despite a
stoical attitude they could not endure pain as well as the whites. They often made
special efforts to assuage the cares and burdens of their maimed and decrepit people.
Corbusier, loe. cit., pp. 24-25; Emory, Notes of a Military Reconnaissance. p. 61.
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find it." 72 This statement especially explained the Apache's
fitness to be nomadic and predatory, for they were at home
anywhere. 73
Meats were a staple part of the diet, large game being
preferred, but rats, hares, coyotes, lizards and caterpillars
were also acceptable. Pork was rejected and fowls were not
eaten except under duress. Horse meat was highly prized
and mule meat was a delicacy. The fetus of a calf and parts
of the viscera of slain animals were titbits. The marrow of
bones and the blood of animals were carefully utilized. Fish,
bear and beaver were avoided entirely as were most animals associated with water. This custom was doubtless due
to forgotten cosmogonic and religious views. 74
Practically every plant of the Apaches' habitat furnished some edible product. Pinon nuts, mesquite beans,
mushrooms, greens, bulbs, roots, wild fruits, acorns, barks
and grass seeds were used in various ways. The cacti family rendered heavy tribute. Mescal, made from the bulb of
the aguave, was indispensable. 75 The 'amount of food available to eat varied with the seasons; sometimes there was
want. When pressed the Apaches would resort to articles
of food unknown or repulsive to white men. Gormandism
charact~rized such an irregular economy, and when unmatured fruits and vegetables were consumed, serious
dietary troubles followed. Infant mortality was largely due
72. Cremony, op. cit., p. 296.
73. Curtis, North American Indians, vol. i, 'p. 131; Bourke, An Apache Campaign,
pp. 30-32.
74. Granville Goodwin, "The Social Di~isions and Economic Life of the Western
Apaches," in American Anthropologi8t, vol. xxxvi, pp. 61-62; S. W. Cozzens, The

Marvellous Country: or Three Years in Arizona and New Merica, the Apaches' Home.
(London. 1874), p. 121; M. R. Harrington, "The Devil Dance of the Apaches," in
The Museum Journal, (Univ. of Penn.), vol. viii, PP. 6-9; P. C. Becknell and Washington Matthews, "Why the Apaches Eat No Fish," Journal of Amer. Folk-Lore,
vol. xi, pp. 107, 112.
75. Lt. Bernard Reilly to P. A., Oct. 31, 1874, A. G. 0., 5053; Walter Hough,
uEnvironmental Interrelations in Arizona," Amer. Anthropologist, vol. xi, pp. 133135; J. G. Bourke, "The Folk-foods of the Rio Grande Valley and Northern Mexico,"
in Journ. of Amer. Folk-Lore, vol. viii, PP. 41-71. The Apaches grew grains and
vegetables to a limited degree. The elaborate process of making mescal is given in
Frank Russell, "The Pima Indians," Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology, (Wash., 1908), p. 70.
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to the immediate change of Apache babies from milk to the
diet of adults. 76
Liquor was a scourge among the Apaches. They drank
that of the whites when available, but relied chiefly on their
own brew called tiswin. This liquor, combined with the
Apache mode of drinking, had perhaps the most effective
result of making men pugnacious and quarrelsome that the
world has ever seen. 77
Goodwin viewed Apache life as tripartite: Hunting was
practiced, but the game was never exhausted or driven from
the Apache range; therefore, the hunters seldom went long
distances for it. Agriculture was followed, but not sufficiently to induce sedentary life; and as users of indigenous
plant foods, the Apaches still found it necessary to hunt and
farm. Their existence, as a consequence, kept them moving
about, following a seasonal schedule. Naturally, they developed habitations adapted to the arid climate of their
range and the constant shifting necessitated by their mode
of life. 78
Their huts, called wickiups by the whites, were hemispherical to bluntly conical in form. They were ten to
twelve feet in diameter and nine to ten in height. Slender
poles stuck in the ground to form a circle with the tops then
bent over and tied together composed the framework.
Rushes, branches or hides spread over this skeleton except
at a vent near the top completed the structure. The interior
was excavated for several inches, and the excess earth was
piled around the outside base. as a protective reenforcement.
Isolation was attempted in wickiup arrangement, yet a
tendency towards congregation by families was usual. This
results in a scattered village of important biological aspects.
76. Dr. W. C. Borden. "Vital Statistics of an Apache Indian Community,"
Boeton Medkal and Surgical Journal, July 6, 1893, pp. 11-12; Dr. James Hoffman,
tiThe Menomine Indians," Fourteenth Annual Repor.t of the Bureau of American
Ethnology, (Wash., 1896), p. 287.
77. Will C. Barnes to the writer, Aug. 6, 1935. Mr. Barnes was first stationed
at Fort Apache in 1880. See also, Ales Hrdlicka, "Method of Preparing Tesvino
among the White River Apaches," in Amer. Anthropologist, vol. vi, p. 191; Tussey,
01'. cit., p. 15.
78. Goodwin, loco cit., p. 63.
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Villages were generally composed of only a few huts; in
seasons of plenty the number might reach a hundred. 79
The Apaches required few technological materials, but
they made a. variety of containers, utensils and implements
of the correct type and design which met their indispensable
needs. As basket makers the tribe reached a high stage of
art with products which easily excelled those of all other
Indians. No doubt this perfection was developed because
the Apaches as nomads found the basket the most effective
container for carrying their property.80 Art was not
reached in pottery making, probably because the vessels
were designed for utility alone. 81
The primitive Apache weapons were bows, arrows and
lances. These arms were objects of much beauty and ingenuity. Catlin regarded the Apaches as unexcelled in the
making of arrowheads. 82 These were mounted on perfectly
smooth and balanced cane shafts about three feet long. The
bows used in shooting them were usually five feet in
length. Bows and arrows were a necessity in Apache life
and the braves were never without them even when armed
with modern weapons. Skillful warriors used them with
deadly effect, and for the picking off of unsuspecting victims they were superior to guns. In close quarters when
other weapons failed or ammunition ran out, they were
79. White, op. cit., p. 21; Ales Hrdlicka, "Notes On the San Carlos Apaches,"
in Amer. Anthropologist, vol. vii, pp. 482-483.
The Apache practice of burning the property and wickiup (frequently a village)
of a tribesman who died, although done for superstitious reasons, was an excellent
health measure. Unfortunately, it led to impoverishment, especially in reservation
days. R. S. Gardner to Comm., Sept. 13, 1886, I. D., 5421. See also H. C. Yarrow,
"The Mortuary Customs of the North American Indians," First Annual Report of the
Bureau of American Ethnology (Wash., 1881). pp. 111-112. The writer as late as May
30, 1936, saw a fire near Fort Apache reported to come from a wickiup where an
Apache had recently died.
80. A. B. Reagan, ms. no. 2847, B. E., pp. 61-66; K. T. Dodge, "White Mountain
Baskets," in Amer. Anthropologist, vol. ii, p. 193. For a very detailed discussion, see
Helen H. Roberts, "The Basketry of the San Carlos Apache," in Anthropological
Papers of the Museum of Natural History, (New York, 1929), vol. xxxi, pt. ii, pp.
121-218.
81. Corbusier, "The Ap8cbe-Yumas and the Apache-Mohaves," loco cit., p. 9.
82. Catlin, Last Rambles, pp. 183-185. See alSo Gerald Fowke, "Stone Art,"
Thirteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, (Wash., 1896),
p. 196.
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especially reliable. Poisoned arrows were frequently used
in war. 83 The lance, also a thing of beauty, was made of the
stalk of the aguave, reenforced at points of strain with
intact pieces of skin peeled from a stag leg. A long knife
blade of a bayonet inserted in the end completed the weapon.
The total length of the lance was about fifteen feet. 84
Unlike the beauty and perfection demanded in their
arms, the Apaches were satisfied with clothes of any variety,
the more grotesque the better. Conventionality existed only
in the des~gn of the moccasins, the breechcloth of the men
and the buckskin skirts of the women. The breechcloth was
about two yards long. It passed between the legs and hung
over the belt in front and behind, the rear part almost
reaching the ground. A common buckskin skirt was composed of two buckskins hung over a belt, one in front and
the other behind in the form of a kilt. The edges of the
skirt were cut in deep fringe. The Apache moccasins were
much like a boot. They reached nearly to the knees, and
each was made of half a buckskin turned over in two or
three folds, allowing them to be drawn up as a protection
to the thighs; otherwise, the folds could be used as receptacles for implements, small arms and trinkets. The soles
were made of undressed cowhide with the hairy side out,
and the toes were turned up two inches to protect the feet
when running. This particular type of moccasin was a
direct response to an environment of poisonous reptiles and
xerophytic vegetation. 85 Thus again is demonstrated that
the Apaches in the world of material things were thorough
students of adaptation. Yet in the organization of their
society they were even more pragmatic.
The family was very important in Apache society, and
83. J. G. Bourke, "Notes on Apache Mythology," in Jour. of Amer. Folk-Lore,
vol. iii, p. 210; Pac. Railroad Reports, vol. ii, Pp. 97-99; White, ms. no. 179, B. E.,
p. 32.
84. Barnes to the writer, Aug. 6, 1935. One of Geronimo's braves at Fort Bowie,
Arizona, gave Mr. Barnes a beautiful lance in September, 1886. This was at the
time the renegades were being exiled to Florida.
85. Gen. O. O. Howard, in Washington Morning Post, Nov. 10, 1872-; Schoolcraft, op. cit., p. 211; Corbusier, loco cit., pp. 6-7.
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marriage occurred at an early age. The debut of an Apache
girl took place during the second year of puberty; after this
she was deemed, marriageable. Usually, girls were permitted to select their husbands, but the men rriade the initial advances. When a suitor felt that he was sufficiently
esteemed he staked his horse in front of his love's abode and
awaited the issue. If she cared for his horse within four
days, the marriage was consummated. Among some bands
a warrior not only had to show his ability to make a living
before marriage, but he also had to build a domicile in advance. The girl then occupied it with him for four nights
without being molested or having her presence observed. If
she prepared his breakfast on the fourth morning, she became his wife. They then returned to the village where the
bride's romance turned to a life of toil and slavish suffering,
typical of an Apache wife. 86
Polygamy was the marital law, but there were restrictions. Individuals had to be members of different clans and
the children 'followed the mother's clan. A man had to
marry his unmarried sisters-in-law as fast as they grew to
maturity. He also had to marry his brother's widows one
year after his brother's demise; However, other' members
of his clan could marry the widows, for clan members were
all considered brothers. This complicated arrangement
was obviously designed to promote household felicity.
Naturally, a man married no more wives than he could
support. Divorce was easy but not abused. No Apache
would speak to his mother-in-law and he apparently never
looked at her; she, in turn, reCiprocated his courtesy.87
Woman's .influence in Apache society was great. A
warrior's standing was determined by the esteem the women
held for him as a brave man and a dexterous thief. And a
86.

245-249;

10;

138.

Cremony. op. cit., Pp.
Farish, vol. vii, p.
Curtis, op. cit., p.
Brides were paid for in horses. The families charged according to their estimation of
the services lost. Hrdlicka, Physiological and Medical Observations, p.
Capt. A. R. Chaffee to Comm., Oct.
I. 0., C
Goddard, Indian8
of the Southwest, loco cit., p.
Bourke, "Notes upon the Gentile Organization," loco
cit., p. 118.
.

87.
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great thief stood high, for he could support many wives
comfortably. A definite division of labor existed between
the sexes, but the women were the mainstays in the Apache
economy so far as everyday life was concerned. 88
The Apaches welcomed the birth of children and their
training, particularly that of the boys, began early. Their
education was mainly physical with the prime objective of
making them able, strong and fearless. Self reliance and
judgment were induced by the elders who gravely consulted
the boys as if they were men. The girls' training was
equally thorough, although their instru'ction was largely of
a domestic nature. 89
A discussion of the Apache political organization, their
government and their laws is very difficult. Bourke and
Cremony, themselves, appear to have had only a modicum
of knowledge on the subject. Before the time of AngloAmerican intrusion, all united tribal governmental organizations had disintegrated, and even the traditions of the
Apaches were vague about this matter. The whites found
the several divisions of the tribe broken up into still more
numerous bands, each one independent of the other. The
bands were held together in close relationship by speech and
custom, but not in political unity. They occasionally_ united
under a capable leader against a common enemy; then they
dissolved with equal facility when the danger was removed. 90
The strongest uniting factor in the bands and tribal
groups was clan and blood relationship. Bourke found
thirty-four Apache clans, and learned that some of them
showed a strong correlation with sedentary neighbors whom
they had conquered in the past. The clans were exogamous
only for regulating marriage and descent in the female
88. Corbusier. loco cit., pp. 15-16; Goodwin, loco cit., p. 58.
89. Geronimo'8 Story, p. 186; White, m8, no. 179, B. E., pp. 89-40; Hrdlicka,
"Notes on the San Carlos Apache," loc cit., PP. 491-492.
90. Clark Wissler, "The Apache Indian," in The Target, vol. lxxxiii, p. 5; Goddard, loco cit., p. 163.
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line. 91 They were named after the peculiarities of their
own habitat such as topographical or locational featur:es
rather than animals. Some were also given the names of
places where certain plants grew. Members of a clan camped
together, united in war and exacted justice. Obligations
were only binding on clan relatives, but this "far flung web
of interrelational obligations" was a strong cohesive force
among all the Western Apache groups.92
The bands were broken up into local groups each. one
possessing a distinct territory. Thus, the local· groups
became the bases for the Apache social and political organization. A typical local group was composed of nine to
thirty wickiups, owned by three to six family groups, and
these, in turn, were composed of from three to eight households. The family group members were usually within the
limit of second maternal cousins, although relatives by marriage were also included. 93
Tradition indicates the probability in primitive times of
great Apache headchiefs. In historic times, however, chiefs
ruled over clans and local groups. . They not only settled
disputes, directed hunting, farming, war, raiding parties,
medicine dances and diplomacy, but also promoted coopera- .
tion among the bands. Generally elected for life, they led
because of prestige and good example, losing the office if
their leadership was not sustained; Hereditary succession
was common among some bands. The chiefs also chose the
captains or headmen who ruled over local groups of only a
few rancherias. The headmen were the same as chiefs in
their respective spheres, and from their number new chiefs
were chosen. War chiefs, sometimes selected when several
tribal divisions united against an enemy, frequently held
their positions for long periods. 94
91. Bourke, loco cit., Pp. 111-114. Exogamy was likely developed to provide more
women workers and to furnish interpreters and spies from other groups. Ibid., p. 120.
92. Ibid., pp. 115, 118; Goodwin, loco cit., p. 58. For a technical account of the·
clan, see Handbook, pt. i, PP. 303-305.
93. Goodwin, loco cit., pp. 55-57.
94. Dr. Michael Steck to W. P. Dole, Sept. 19, 1863, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., H. E. D.
no. 1, vol. iii, p. 63; Higgins, ms. no. 180, B. E., pp. 11-13; Reagan, op. cit., p. 45.
Geronimo's Story, p. 35, footnote no. 1 p. 114, L. Farrand. Basis of American
History, Amer. Nation Series (New York, 1904), chap. xiii.
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The warriors stood next to the chiefs in importance.
Their training was very rigorous and they seldom attained
the coveted rank until they were seventeen. A young man
must have accompanied a war party four times in the
capacity of a servant. If his conduct was creditable, the
council made him a warrior of the lowest rank; if not, he
had to await invitation. From this rank he arose by his own
prowess, for the council never voted on a warrior again except to make him a chief. Old men did not lead in battle,
but their advice was always respected. 95
The Apaches developed ideas of justice much in contrast to those of civilized peoples. Murderers in primitive
days were so declared by the tribal council. The next of kin
to the murdered person could then challenge the criminal to
a duel. The entire village witnessed the affray and the outcome was binding. If a close relative refused to challenge,
some other warrior relative could seek ·retribution. Not
infrequently, the friends of an innocent victim killed a cold.
blooded murderer. Such reprisal usually resulted in a destructive factional fight which was finally settled by a payment of horses to the most injured group. Criminals were
often banished in such a manner that they could not join
other tribes. If they afterward banded together in too
strong numbers they were exterminated. 96
Trials by jury were also held. Aggrieved individuals
who did not wish to settle a difficulty personally could complain to the chief; and occasionally the band made investigations and placed charges. The chief, if the case were serious,
then called in two or three prominent men to sit with him.
In case of conviction the plaintiff fixed the penalty, subject
to the confirmation of the chief and his associates. 97
95. Geronimo'. Story, pp. 37, 189·190.
The organization of an ordinary
war party was a simple matter. Some chief or a rising young warrior arranged a war
dance. A circle was marked off in such a manner as to indicate the number desired,
the distance to be travelled and when they would leave. The warriors wishing to
participate entered the circle and chanted in unison. The medicine men accompanied
the party to advise and incite them to deeds of valor, but they did not fight. Higgins,
op. cit., p. 15; Corbusier, loco cit., p. 17.
96. Crook to A. G., April 12, 1884, A. G. 0., 1818; Capt. Emmett Crawford to
A. A. G., Mar. 30, 1884, ibid.; Cremony, op. cit., p. 293.
97. Geronimo's Story, pp. 185-186.
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No individuals exercised greater influence among the
Apaches than the medicine men. They wielded great power
in all phases of life. Their cult was usually composed of
men of superior ability-crafty, scheming and political.
Their special powers and knowledge were supposed to have
been received in dreams or in connection with some notable
event in their lives; and they were credited as worthy on
demonstration of their ability to cure. 9S
The medicine men possessed no systemized body of
knowledge, but used individual mystic rites and weird ceremonies. Specialization also flourished to a considerable
degree. With their methods, designed to excite the patient's
imagination, they effected cures by driving the evil spirits
away. Failures _in . practice were attributed to certain
witches-usually enemies or old women-and sometimes the
sacrifice of these offenders as an appeasement to the evil
spirits was demanded and secured. Naturally, such a system engendered many inter-tribal schisms and much widespread violence.99
The medicine men in addition to their strictly medicinal
ritualistic work, conducted all the important ceremonials
pertaining to Apache customs and traditions. These rites
are without the scope of this study, but they were undoubtedly a powerful impediment to the government's subjugation· and control program. Neverthless,Hrdlicka
decided that the common sense of the Apaches left them
98. Hrdlicka, Physiological and Medical .observations. p. 22 et seq. Corbusier
gives a very beautiful legend describing· how medicine men received their supernatural
·powers. Corbusier, loco cit., Pp. 18-19. Some untraditional views are given in M. E.
Opler, "The Concept of Supernatural Powers among the Chiricahua and Mescalero
Apaches," in Amer. Anthropologist, vol. xxxvii, pp. 65-70.
99. Capt. F. ·E. Pierce to Comm., Sept. I, 1836, I. 0., 27248. For an exhaustive
study of the medicine man, see J. G. Bourke, 'The Medicine-man of the Apaches,"
Ninth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology (Wash., 1892), pp. 443595. See A. B. Reagan, "The Apache Medicine Ceremonies Performed over the
Daughter of C 30," in Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Sciences (Indpls., 1904),
pp. 275-285 for a detailed case of "medicine,"
Medical practices with a scientific basis were not restricted to the medicine men.
A discussion of the practices is given by E. Andrews, "Military Surgery among the
Apaches," in Chicago Medical E",aminer, 1869, vol. x, Pp. 599-601.
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"less hampered in making progress by aboriginal traditions,
beliefs and observances than other Southwestern Indians." 100
100.

Hrdlicka. "Notes on the San Carlos Apaches," loco cit., p. 505.

336

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
CHAPTER II
A CLASH AND A PROBLEM

HE SPANISH, in their imperious conquest of the North
American aborigines, encountered. little opposition
from the sedentary Pueblo tribes along the Rio Grande del
Norte, as they extended their elongated northern frontier
to the very heart of the continent. With equal ease they
extended their sway over the docile California tribes as far
north as San Francisco Bay. But forming a great human
wedge between these conquered peoples, the Apache groups
presented a formidable obstacle to exploration and conquest
and constituted a serious threat to the Spanish settlements
for several hundred miles south of the Rio Gila.!
The territory which lay between the two prongs of the
Spanish fro.ntier remained essentially a terra incognita
until Padre Kino, from 1687-1711, pushed civilization northward into wh;:tt later became the Gadsden Purchase. 2 By
1750, the San Pedro and Santa Cruz valleys of the present
southern Arizona were in Umarked state of prosperity, but
the persistent attacks of the Apaches· and the peculation of
the Spanish officialdom completely reversed the situation
during the next thirty-six years. 3 In fact, .enough of the
region had been abandoned 4 to create fear that there might
be a sharp regression of the northern Spanish frontier
contiguous to Apacheria. As a consequence, General Ugarte
in 1786 by order of the viceroy, introduced some radical
changes in Indian policy whereby the Apaches by force of
arms were to be compelled to make treaties with the Spanish.

T

1. Rufus K. WylIys, Pioneer Padre: The Life and Times of Eusebio Francisco
Kino (Dallas, 1935), pp. 53-55, 196; C. E. Chapman, The Founding of Spanish California (New York, i916). p. 66; H. E. Bolton, Rim of Christendom; A Biography of
Eusebio Francisco Kino, Pacific Coast Pioneer (New York, 1936), p. 241 et seq.
2. Ibid.
3. J. B. Salpointe, Soldiers of the Cross (Banning, Calif., 1898), p. 134; R. J.
Hinton, A Handbook to Arizona (New York, 1875), p. 72; Patrick Hamilton, The
Resources of Arizona, p. 19.
4. See the letter dated November 24, 1777, from Manuel Barragua of Tubac to
Allande y Savedra, commandant of the Presidio of Tucson (Pac. Railroad Reports,
vol. vii, appendix C, pp. 29-30), for a vivid account of the Apache inroads.
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When a peace basis should be achieved, the reduced Indians
were to be closely watched, kindly treated, furnished. supplies, encouraged to settle near the presidios, taught to drink
intoxicants and to be made dependent upon Spanish friend-·
ship for their needs. 5
There are few details regarding the working of the
policy during the next twenty-five years, but the slight indication of devastations argues that the government at an
expenditure of $18,000 to $30,000 a year must have had
unusual success. At least, Sonoran establishments had their
nearest approximation to prosperity during this period. 6
The chaotic conditions in New Spain after 1811, resulted in a complete breakdown of the Apache policy, and
the factional struggles of Mexican politicians after the
Revolution prevented even the regaining of a semblance of
control. Don. Ignacio Zuniga, commander of the northern
frontier presidios estimated that from 1820-1835, 5000
Mexicans were killed, 100 settlements destroyed and about
4000 settlers forced to leave the region. With the exception
.of the garrisoned towns of Tucson and Tubac, the remaining parts of northern Sonora had become ranchos despoblados. 7 And by 1848, even the important town of Fronteras
was in the hands of the savages. 8 Such were the conditions
when by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,9 ratified on May
5. Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, pp. 378-379.
6. Ibid.
7. Farish, vol. i, pp. 78-79; Alphonse Pinart, "Voyage en Sonora" in the BuUetin
de la Societe de Geographie (Paris, 1880), vol. xx, p. 208 et seq. Pinart, a famous
French savant, did much scientific. work in Northern Mexico during the 1870's under
the auspices of the Societe de Geographie. See also, his "Voyage dans I'Arizona,"
Extrait du Bulletin de la Societe de Geographie, Mars. 1877.
8. Bartlett, Personal Recollections, vol.· i, pp. 262-269.
9. Wm. M. Malloy, Treaties. Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and
Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909.
(Washington, 1910), vol. i, PP. 1107-1121.
Under the 11th article of the treaty the United States agreed to (1) restrain
Indian raids into Mexico, and to exact satisfaction when they should occur; (2) to
make it illegal to own captives or property taken from Mexico by Indians; (3) rescue
and deliver up all Mexican captives, and (4) bear in mind the security of the Mexican frontier in laws governing Indian removals. Ibid., PP. 1112·1113. J. Fred Rippy.
The United States and Mexico (New York, 1926), p. 68; James M. Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), pp. 209, 215.
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30, 1848, Mexico was forced to cede New Mexico and California to the United States.
At the time of the treaty, the Southwest was fairly well
known to the Americans. The opening of the Santa Fe Trail
in 1822 made Santa Fe the mart for the exchange of all the
products of New Mexico, northern Mexico and a part of
California; consequently, American adventurers and trappers had penetrated into every section of the region. Led
by such bold spirits as Antoine Leroux, Sylvester and James
Pattie, Bill Williams,1° Felix Aubrey, Pauline Weaver and
Kit Carson, the intruders from the· East soon gave the
Apache tribal councils cause to question the desirability of
friendship with the aggressive Anglo-AmericansP
Although the more aggressive chiefs began to rise in
influence, it is probable the proponents of peace would have
triumphed, had not certain unscrupulous Ame~icans become
tools of the Sonoran and Chihuahuan governments in treacherous attempts to exterminate some of the Apache bands
near the Santa Rita Mines. 12
These events of 1838 resulted in the Mimbrenos making
the able and warlike Mangas Coloradas their chief. He
immediately settled the factional disputes among his bands,
cleared southwestern New Mexico of Mexicans, and made
his region so formidable that American trappers ventured
10. For the work of the Patties, see Timothy Flint, The Personal Narrative of
James O. Pattie,. in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, vol. xviii (Cleveland, 1905).
BiII Williams' career is adequately covered in Alpheus H. Favour, Old Bill Williams,
Mountain Man, (Chapel HiII), 1936.
11. Edwin L. Sabin, Kit Carson Days, 1809-1869 (New York, 1935), vol. I,
pp. 43-44; Frank C. Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona ( New York, 1932), PP. 6770; Paul I. Wellman, Death in the Desert (New York, 1935), p. 5. See also, George
F. Ruxton, Life in the Far West (New York, 1844), pp. 110-111. Ruxton's account of
the killing of an Apache chief might be considered as a model of exaggeration by the
early sensationalists.
12. Emory, Notes of a Military Reconnaissance, p. 71; Woodworth Cluni, Apache
Agent, pp. 5, et seq. See, Daniel W. Jones, Forty Years among the Indians (Salt Lake
City, 1890), p. 367, for similar perfidious acts of the whites.
.
The Santa Rita Mines near the present Silver City, New Mexico, were opened
In 1804. For over thirty years they supported a population of 600 people who carried
on a keen trade with Mexican centers. In 1838 after the attempts at extermination, tI1e
Apaches forced the abandonment of the region. The mines were not reOpened until
1850. Bartlett, op. cit., pp. 227-228.
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into it only with the greatest temerity. During the next
eight years he cemented his position among the Apache
groups by successful raids into Mexico and by the marriage
of his three half-breed daughters to prominent chiefs of
neighboring tribes. 1s
The Apaches might thus have remained undisturbed for
many years had not the Mexican War sent troops through
their range. Although they remained generally friendly
during the time, intelligent military observers foresaw the
task the. government would have in reducing them to its
controI.14 Neither did the endof the war lessen the problem,
for the Apaches in their belief that peace made legitimate
their Mexican raids, merely increased them in frequency
and daring. This convinced civil and military authorities
that the government could never comply with its recent
Mexican treaty obligations.15
Indeed, the Americans themselves were soon faced with
direct hostilities. On February 2, 1850, a band of Gila
Apaches in an attack on the town of Dona Ana, killed one
man and wounded three. While Major Enoch Steen was
after them in vigorous pursuit another band cleared the
settlement of stock. The major at once advised the location of a post at Santa Rita to overawe the hostiles. 16
Captain A. W. Bowman, who was sent to investigate
the situation, reported that the Apaches faced by the failure
of their game supply, said, "We must steal from somebody;
and if you will not permit us to rob the Mexicans, we must
steal from you, or fight you." He estimated that there were
1,100 warriors near the place who would have to be fed or
IS. Pac. Railroad Reports, vol. iii, p. 80; Cremony, Life among the Apaches, pp.
30. 308.
14. Journal of Capt. A. R. Johnson in Emory's Notes, pp. 579, et. seq.; Col. St.
George Cooke to Gov. Don Manuel Gandara, Dec. 18, 1846, in ibid., p. 563; R. B.
Marcy, Report (on the route from Fort Smith to Santa Fe) 1849: in 31 Cong., 1
BeBB., S. E. D., no. 64, p. 197.
15. Gen. PerBifor F. Smith to A. A. G., May 25, 1850, 31 Cong., 2 BeBB., S. E. D.
nO. I, vol. i, P. 77; Annual Rept.· of Gen. T. S. J eBUp, Nov. 20, 1850, ibid., p. 123; 31
Cong., 1 BeBB., H. E. D. no. 17. pp. 191 et seq.
16. See letters of Steen to A. A. G., Feb. 5. and Mar. 24, 1850, in 31 Cong., 2
BeBB., S. E. D. no. I, vol. i, pp. 68-72.
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exterminated. He insisted upon the establishment of a six..,
company post,17 Almost simultaneously the commissioner of
Indian affairs suggested the appointment of an agent for
the Southern Apaches. 18 And during the fall, Secretary of
War C. M. Conrad, informed President Fillmore that the
prohibitive costs and the inadequacy of the army of 12,927
men made it expedient to settle the Apaches on reserves and
induce them to start farming, rather than to subdue them
by force,19
The first step taken was the establishment of Fort
Webster at Santa Rita by Colonel John Munroe in command
of the department of New Mexico. Depredations stopped,
the mines were reopened and a Gila chief went to Santa Fe
to see Superintendent Calhoun. 20 These results convinced
the superintendent that the Gila Apaches could easily be controlled if Congress would do its part. 21
The War Department acted first, however, by replacing Colonel Munroe with Colonel E. V. Sumner. He was
instructed to cooperate with Calhoun, but to pursue an aggressive policy towards the Indians. 22 Meanwhile, Calhoun
prepared to go to Santa Rita to make a treaty. When he
requested an escort Sumner violated his recent instructions
of cooperation by a flat refusal; whereupon, Calhoun reported that Indian affairs would necessarily have to be
neglected or conducted by the army.23
During the summer the United States Boundary Commission headed by James R. Bartlett, spent several weeks
near Santa Rita in close association with the Mimbrefios.
At first the friendliness of the Indians and the frequent
17. Bowman to A. Quartmaster, April 21, 1850, 31 Cong., 2· sess., S. E. D. no. I,
vol. i, pp. 295-297.
18. Orlando Brown to J as. S. Calhoun, April 24, 1850 in Calhoun Corresprmdence,
pp. 192, 225.
19. 31 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, p. 1.
20. Munroe to Gen. R. Jones, Jan. 27, 1851, Calhoun Corresprmdence, p. 290.
21. Calhoun to Luke Lea, Feb. 16, 1851, ibid., P. 293.
22. Conrad to Sumner, April I, 1851, 32 Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no. I, vol. i, p.
125.

23. Calhoun to Lea, July 30, 1851, Calhoun
22, 1851, ibid., p. 401.

Aug.

Correspondence, p.

394; same to same,
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visits of the chiefs convinced Bartlett that the tribe was
eager for peace with the Americans; but it was evident to
him that they would allow no interference with the captives
or plunder taken by them on their Mexican raids. 24 Nevertheless, he did interfere, and notwithstanding military aid
from Fort Webster, he lost so many animals and was so
harried that he was practically forced out of the region
afoot. Indeed, the military fared little better than he. 25
The Indians were now convinced that they had driven the
whites away, and it is doubtful that any good would ha:ve
resulted had an agent been attached to the commission as
desired by Calhoun.26
Apache relations were further complicated at the time
by a rush of 150 desperate gold miners into a new field discovered at Pinos Altos, near Santa Rita. And when Mangas
Coloradas sought to get them away by telling of bonanzas
in remote Sonora, the miners severely flogged him to expose
his ulterior motives. This was an evil day in Apache affairs.
Not only was the chief's back scarred, but the wound to his
pride was deeper and more permanent. From that moment
on until he was killed during the Civil War, his desire for
revenge against all whites was never satiated. 27 Numerous
Apaches also suffered death at the hands of the miners, but
the remissness of. the civil authority in meting out severe
punishment to the murderers, merely increased the tribe's
hostility.28
Neither were the relations improved by uncertainties
24.
25.

300-302.

Bartlett, Personal RecoUections, vol. i, pp.
Geo. Gibbs ms. no.
Bur. of Ethnology; Bartlett, op. cit., p.
et seq.;
Report of Lt. J. D. Graham on Mexican Boundary Line with Bartlett,
Cong., 1 Bess.,
S. E. D. no.
pp.
In
Manuelito, a Navaho chief and Bon-in-law of Mangas Coloradas, revealed
that the troops activities at Fort Webster, had prevented Mangas with the aid of
Navaho allies from exterminating the commission. Crernony. Life among the Apaches;
p.84.
For the famous case of Inez Gonzales, who was recovered by Bartlett and restored
to her family in Sonora, .see Bartlett, op. cit., pp.
Wellman, Death in the. Desert, p.
Calhoun to Lea, Aug.
Calhoun
Correspondence, p.
Clum, Apache Agent, pp.
Wellman. op. cit., pp.
Sumner to Jones, Feb.
Calhoun Correspondence, p.

1868,

1864,

26.

27.
28.

121,

32

25-26.

810

400

415.

54;

31-32;
3, 1852,

306-309.

31, 1851,

56-57.

479.
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which appear to have developed in connection with the
establishment of Fort Webster. Apparently the post was.
intended as a temporary one to furnish proteCtion to the
boundary commission; therefore, when the commission
moved away, the troops evacuated at once, and in undue
haste perhaps, because of a threatened alliance between the
Apaches and the Navahos. 29 This action, of course, augmented the hostiles' courage, as it did their numbers, for
many Mexican Apaches now immigrated into the Gila
country to take advantage of the immunities afforded by the
new boundary line. 30
.
Regardless of causes, the Apaches became so aggressive
in early 1852, that they practically held the country to the
east and the west of the Rio Grande Valley. Not only this,
but also in their raids (which the United States had pledged
herself to stop), they were practically driving civilization
from northern Mexico. In that part of Mexico, which was
soon to be known as the Gadsden Purchase, travellers and
adventures found the region a land of widows,31 in which
all agricultural activity had stopped, and where in the
eastern part, even pastoral activities were carried on under
the protection of field pieces. 32 In the western part Tucs.on
and Tubac with a combined population of 1,009, maintained
a most precarious hold. 33
Bartlett was now convinced the United States could not
stop the raids until the savages were forced to give up their
predatory habits; and Lieutenant A. W. Whipple, more
realistically, recommended four permanent posts for their
, 29. Chas. Overman to Calhoun, Aug, 31, 1851, ibid., p. 420; Sumner to Jones,
1, 1852, ibid., p. 433.
30. Gen. E. A. Hitchcock to Secty. of War, Oct. 28, 1851, 32 Cong., 2 sess.,
S. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 29.
Jan.

31. Captain M.. J. Box, Captain J. Box's Adventures. and Explorations in New
and Old Mexico, (New York, 1869), pp. 26-28. This unusual volume was found in
the Rare Book Collection of the Library of Congress.
32. Julius Froebel, Seven Years, p. 397. See also chapts. xi, xii and xiii.
Wislizenus, a few years earlier, predicted the Mexicans would become the vassals
of the Apaches. Dr. A. Wislizenus. Memoir of a ~l'our to Northern Mexico, connected
with Colonel Doniphan's Expedition in 1846-47, 30 Cong., 1 sess., S. M. D. no. 26, p. 26.
33. A. B. Gray to Robt. McClelland, May, 1853, 33 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. 55,
vol. vii, p. 33.
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control: one at the Copper Mines,one on the Rio Salinas,
one at the mouth of Rio San Pedro and another on the Rio
Colorado. 34 High officials, however, were apparently unwilling to undertake any comprehensive steps, but Calhoun, who
had recently become governor of New Mexico, sent Charles
Overman to make a treaty with the Gilas if the opportunity
developed. 35 He also angled for the support of Secretary of
State Webster, by declaring that a general Indian war
threatened. 36
As the spring advanced the situation did become so
menacing as to create a cooperative attitude on the part of
Colonel Sumner, who now offered the governor one hundred
stands of arms to equip a body of citizen militia. 37 But a
dispute over deliverance of the arms, voided the effort, and
the colonel decided to make a general campaign with the
regular troops.38 Before this could be done the general
political situation in New Mexico became so threatening
that the colonel modified his plans by appropriating those
of Calhoun. 30
Meanwhile, Calhoun stricken by a fatal illness had left
for the States. 4 °In his place he left John Greiner as acting
superintendent, and Greiner immediately arranged through
runners to meet the Gila chiefs at the Acoma Pueblo for a
peace powwow. Colonel Sumner, however, decided to conduct the negotiations himself, and after virtually forcing
Greiner to accompany him, made a satisfactory treaty on
July 21, for which Greiner claimed the main credit. 41
34. Bartlett, vol. i, p. 406-; vol. ii, p. 384 et seq; Whipple to Graham, Jan. 10,
1852, 32 Cong., 1 sess. ; S. E. D. no. 121, pp. 221-225.
35. Calhoun to Overman, Feb. 25, 1852, Calhoun Correspondence, p. 483.
36. Calhoun to Daniel Webster, Feb. 29, 1852, ibid:, pp. 485-486.
37. Sumner to Calhoun, Mar. 21, 1852, ibid., p. 493.
38. Sumner to Calhoun, April 8, 1852, ibid., p. 520.
39. Sumner to Secty. of War, May 27, 1852, 32 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no .1,
pt. ii, p. 25.
40. He died on the plains near Independence, Mo., in late May. Calhoun COTTespondence, p. 541.
41. Greiner to Lea, July 31, 1852, with all enclosures, ibid., pp. 541-544. For the
treaty, see Chas. J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, (Washington,
1904), .vol. ii, pp. 598-600. Kappler gives July I, as the date of the treaty. It was
ratified by the Senate on Mar. 23, 1853. U. S. R. S., vol. x, p. 979.
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No efforts at civil control followed the treaty until the
next April, when the new governor, W. C. Lane, made further
treaties whereby the Indians were to receive corn, salt, b,eef
and some breeding animals for the first year, and a reasonable amount of subsistence during the next three years.
Without awaiting the senate's action, he collected a large
number of Mimbrenos near Fort Webster, and advanced
considerable funds. In August he was replaced by David
Meriwether, who found the funds practically exhausted
almost at the moment he learned the senate had refused
ratification. As a consequence, the Indians were soon
hungry, and thus infuriated by the bad faith of the whites,
they subsisted themselves during the next year at the expense of the settlements which were reported to have suffered a loss of several lives and nearly $100,000 worth of
property.42
In addition to the government's bad faith the Apache
problem was intensified by the reestablishment of a garrison
at Fort Webster, by the presence of numerous surveying and
exploring parties in their countrY,43 and by the increased
immigration passing through the Southwest to the California gold fields. 44 In fact, the avalanche of immigration
that poured through Apacheria following the discovery of
gold set up a chain of events that resulted in the Gadsden
Purchase, ratified by Mexico and the United States on
June 30,1854.45 Naturally, the governm'ent seized the oppor42. Meriwether to G. W. Manypenny, Sept. 1, 1854, 33 Cong., 2 seBS.•, S. E. D.
no. 1, vol. i, pp. 374-375.
43. Capt. L. Sitgreaves, "Report of an Expedition down the Zuni and Colorado
Rivers," 32 Cong., 2 Bess., S. E. D. no. 59, p. 6, et seq; Report of U. S. and Mexican
Boundary Survey, vol. i. p. 51, et seq; Pac. Railroad Reparts, vol. ii, p. 14, vol. iii,
pp. 80, 93, passim. See also Julius Froebel, Seven YearB, P. 477.
44. Ralph P. Bieber, "The Southwestern Trails to California in 1849," in Mississippi yaney Historical Review, vol. xii, p. 360 et seq; M. E. Martin, "California Emmigrant Roads through Texas," in Southwestern Historical Quarterly, vol. xviii, p. 287
et seq.
45. Malloy, Treaties. vol. i, pp. 1121, et seq; Paul N. Garber. The Gadsden Treaty.
(Phila., 1923). p. 145. J. Fred Rippy. "The Negotiation of the Gadsden Treaty,"
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, vol. xxvii, pp. 1-26 ;-The United States and Mexico; pp. 126-167.
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tunity to abrogate the impossible article xi 46 of the treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but by acquiring more Apaches as
well as more of the country over which they raided, its problem of control was vastly increased.47
The magnitude of the increased problem apparently
discouraged Governor Meriwether from attempting any
immediate conciliatory gestures,48 but Congress came to his
aid on July 31 by appropriating $30,000 for the purchase of
goods, tools and presents to be used in making treaties with
the hostile tribes. 49 Even with this encouragement Meriwether made no effort to make peace with the Gilas until
the next summer, and then not until they had been thoroughly
overawed by General Garland's severe handling of the Utes,
Jicarillas and Mescaleros. 5o But at this propitious moment
he had little difficulty in getting the chiefs to make a treaty,
whereby the bands were to take up agriculture under the
direction of a resident agent, Dr. Michael Steck. 51
Doctor Steck, who was well known to the Gilas, went to
their camping grounds at once, where he was welcomed with
manifestations of friendship; but more important, he found
them eager to start farming. As a consequence he put them
to work, and to their credit they raised fair crops the first
season. Spurred on by their success, they did much better
the next year, producing in addition to their regular needs,
half enough surplus in corn and vegetables to subsist themselves during 1857. 52
But while the Indians under the immediate supervision
of the agent thus became quite tractable, certain bands of
46: Secretary of War Conrad gave much attention to this matter in his annual
reports for 1851 and 1852. See 32 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, pt. 1, and 32
Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, Pp. 5, 23-26.
47. Report of U. S. and Mexican Boundary Survey, vol. i, p. 51 et seq; Pac.
Railroad Reports, voL ii, p. 13, passim.
48. Meriwether to Manypenny, Sept. I, 1854, op. cit., p. 373.
49. Manypenny to Meriwether, Mar. 16, 1855, 34 Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no. 1,
vol. i, p. 526.
50. 34 Cong., 1 sess. S. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, Pp. 63-66, 71-72.
51. Meriwether to Manypenny, Sept. (1), 1855, 34 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1,
vol. i, PP. 507-508. The treaty did not touch the Apache bands further west.
52. Same to same, Sept. 30, 1856, 34 Cong., 3 sess., S. E. D. no. 2, vol. v, p. 731.
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related Mogollons farther to the west, incensed, no doubt,
by the posting of troops in the Gadsden Purchase,53 began
marauding against the Rio Grande settlements. To end
the raids Lieutenant Horace Randall with a strong command
in November, pursued fifty of the raiders for over three
hundred miles-well beyond the present Arizona line. Although a large number of stolen animals were recovered,54
the pursuit merely demonstrated the futility of such tactics.
Nevertheless, it led to the immediate establishment of Fort
Buchanan in the very heart of the Gadsden Purchase. 55
Apparently the western bands became bolder in 1857,
for they extended their murderous raids in all directions,
. especially southward into Mexico. From here after completely destroying many 'flourishing haciendas, they returned
with numerous captives and great herds of stock. 56 But
Colonel B. L. Bonneville in temporary command of the department, took no action until the Navaho agent, H. L.
Dodge, was brutally murdered near Zufii. 57 He then ordered
Colonel Dixon S. Miles with a force of 400 men to crush the
hostiles. Late in June, Miles moved quickly into an unknown country along the upper Gila, trapped a large band
thirty-five miles from Mount Graham on the 27th, killed
forty-two, captured thirty-six and destroyed much of their
growing crops. Almost simultaneously Colonel W. W. Loring, detached to the north, struck another band at the
Cafion de Los Muertos Carneros, where, in addition to killing seven more (including the notorious Cuchillo Negro),
he seized several families along with over one thousand head
of stock. In all, the expedition suffered only ten casualties. 58
Unfortunately, the expedition produced no permanent
53. The first troops sent to the region probably took post at Tucson, early in
1856. 34 Cong., 3 sess. S. E. D. no. 5, vol. iii, p. 3.
54. 35 Cong., 1 sess. S. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, p. 52.
55. A. B. Bender, "Frontier Defense in the Territory of New Mexico, 1853-1861,"
in New Mexico Historical Review, voL ix, p. 352.
56. Lt. Sylvester Mowry to J. W. Denver, Nov. 10, 1857, 35 Cong., 1 sess.
H. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, p. 586.
57. Steck to Denver, Aug. 7, 1857, ibid., p. 577.
58. The numerous reports covering the expedition are given in, 35 Cong., 1 sess.
S. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, Pp. 135-141.
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effects; nevertheless, the crestfallen Mogollons did ask for
a conference with Bonneville and Steck, to which the Pinal
captains were also invited. In a talk lasting three days the
Indians admitted their guilt, and three chiefs offered their
lands in exchange for peace. This overture was refused,
but Bonneville told them dire punishment would follow any
further depredations. 59 Steck, however, gained some new
views as a result of the conference, especially when he
learned the expedition had frightened away his peaceable
charges. As a consequence, he informed the commissioner
of Indian affairs that in a region so poorly defended, and
where the Indians must plunder to exist, a pacific policy
characterized by a liberal distribution of subsistence was
best if the Indian's methods of a century were to be radically changed. 60
Colonel James L. Collins, who had succeeded Meriwether as superintedent,61 pushed Steck's views even further
when he informed Denver that ultimately the department
would be forced to choose between a policy of peace and
subsistence, or one of "total extermination." 62 Declaring
that a pacific policy was preferabl~, he constructively rec':'
ommended the establishment of a reservation on the Gila at
a point far removed from the settlements and vested interests. Here under the shadow of a large military post that
would be necessitated, he believed the bands could easily be
concentrated, fed and kept at peace. 63
With more of a material outlook, Lieutenant Sylvester
Mowry insisted that the Indian policy should be shaped to
bring a greater development of the Overland Route and the
budding mining enterprises of the Gadsden Purchase. He
59. Steck to J. L. Collins, Sept. 4, 1857, 35 Cong., 1 sess. H. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii,
pp. 580-583.
60. Steck to Denver, Aug. 7, 1857, ibid., p. 577.
61. The offices of governor and superintendent were separated in 1857. R. E.
Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History (Cedar Rapids,
vol. ii, p.
314, footnote 241.
62. Collins to Denver, Aug. 7, 1857, 35 Cong., 1 sess. H. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, pp.
579-580.
63. Same to same,' Aug. 30, 1857, ibid., p. 564.
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preferred extermination, but suggested that a cavalry post
near Tucson, one on the San Pedro and another above the
Pima Villages, would keep the Indians hemm,ed in to the
north of the Gila where they could do little damage. 54
Impressed with these suggestions, Secretary of War
John B. Floyd enlarged upon them by recommending the
establishment of a strong line of cavalry and infantry posts
along the entire Indian frontier, close enough to the bands'
habitat to preV'ent the sallying forth of raiding parties.55
When Congress took no action the territorial legislature, at
first disappointed, became desperate, and in the following
February, sent in a petition requesting the removal of the
wild tribes to some point north of the 34th paralleI.55 Again
they were disappointed; but more to their dismay, the number of troops defending the southern settlements was sharply
reduced. 57 In fact, General Garland himself somewhat dismayed by the activity of Land Office surveyors in the Indian
country, in vain asked his superiors for instructions. 58
In contrast to the'lethargy at Washington, Agent Steck
on the headwaters of the Gila, continued his constructive
control. Although the Gilas had suffered many injustices
including numerous killings, they showed great restraint in
allowing small parties of,immigrants to travel unmolested
through their country. Diseases contracted from the whites
had reduced the warrior strength one-half, but this, no
doubt, along with the pacific influence of Mangas Coloradas,
was what caused them to center their attention on the cultivation of their 150 acres of corn. To' Steck the only hope
for their survival lay in the early estabIlshment of a reservation far removed from the enervating influence of the
64. Mowry to Denver; Nov. 10, 1857, ibid., pp. 587, 591. Mowry's ideas are closely
akin to those formed by Lt. J. G. Parke on his survey through Apacheria in 1854.
See Pac. Railroad Reports, vol. ii, p. 13; vol. vii, p. 35.
55. 35 Cong., 1 sess. H. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, pp. 4-5.
66. 35 Cong., 1 sess. S. M. D. no. 208, pp. 1-2.
57. Gen. Garland to C. A. Hoppin, April 7, 1858, 35 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. I,
vol. ii, p. 293.
58. Garland to Army Headquarters, May 31, 1858, ibid., p. 290.
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whites. 69 In addition Steck, by unofficially cultivating the
friendship of visiting White Mountains bands, also managed to exercise considerable restraint over the Apaches to
the west. He even became sanguine enough to predict that
a general council with the various bands would stop their
raids into the Gadsden Purchase. 70
Concerned over these raids the Indian Office sent Special Agent George Bailey to study the situation. Without
delay he reported that most of the raids did emanate from
north of the Gila, and that the raiders on their return with
their plunder from Mexico and the Gadsden Purchase, by
necessity, had to follow the few water courses through the
region; therefore, the location of a post at the mouth of the
Aravaipa, one at the crossing of the San Pedro and one near
the site of Fort Webster would solve the difficulty and be
cheaper than depredation claims. 71
The report immediately decided the Department of the
Interior that a "decisive policy was necessary"; and President Buchanan seizing the opportunity, but with his vision
more extended than to mere Indian control, suggested to
Congress that the rapid development of the Gadsden Purchase demanded the -location of some strong posts in Northern Mexico. 72
Alarmed at the probability of military control, the civil
officials moved first by holding a conference in December
with the Chiricahuas near Apache Pass. Steck easily exacted
their promise not to molest immigration along the Overland
Route; but he reported that the situation would be more
secure if they were removed further north. 73 In the following February, he also counseled at Canon del Oro with 300
Pinal chiefs and warriors, reported as representing 3000
Indians. Although the Indians readily promised peace,
69. Steck to Collins. Aug. 10. 1858, 35 Cong., 2. sess. H. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, pp.
548-551.
70. Ibid.• p. 550.
71. Bailey to C. E. Mix. Nov. 4, 1858, Ibid.• p. 558.
72. James D. Richardson. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents. (Washington, 1896-1899). vol. iv. p. 3045.
73. Steck to Collins, Aug. 12, 1859, 36 Cong., 1 sess. S. E. D. no. 2, vol. i, p. 714.
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most of the settlers thought severe punishment alone would
make the peace real,74
In order to ascertain the true condition of the region,
Colonel Bonneville in the early summer made an extended
inspection of the Apache country. Near Santa Rita he
found the Mimbrefios quite tractable, but taking Dr. Steck's
advice, he ordered the establishment of a post as a protection to the miners. Further to the west, the Chiricahuas
outside of numerous thefts of stock which they declared
they had mistaken for Mexican animals, were keeping the
peace. But Bonneville saw at a glance that protection was
necessary for the development of the San Pedro and Santa
Cruz valleys. He therefore recommended the establishment
of a two-company post in the "Tucson Mountains," and
another of equal strength on the San Pedro. 75
Before action could be taken, however, the savages in
a sharp attack on the Patagonia mines killed a prominent
citizen. This proved that the peace was unreal; but the
military from fear of retaliations along the immigrant route
remained quiet, and-asked the department commander,
Colonel T. T. Fauntleroy, for instructions. 76
In contrast to the erratic Chiricahuas, the Mimbrefios
and Mogollons under Dr. Steck were causing the government
little worry. As disease and vice decimated their ranks
(their warrior strength had decreased from 400 to 150)
they became more sedentary, and they were now growing
crops for a distance of three miles along the Santa Lucia
River. Trouble was caused by their use of Mexican liquor,
but instead of depredating on the Americans, they raided
into Mexico for their plunder and animals. If a reservation
could not be given them, Steck reported the only other alternative was to force them north of the Gila. 77
74.
75.
PP. 306,
junction
76.
77.

Ibid.
Bonneville to A. A. G., July 15, 1859, 36 Cong., 1 sess. S. E. D. no; 2, vol. ii,
309; A. B. Bender, op. cit. p. 367. Fort Breckenridge was established at the
of the San Pedro and the Arivaipa late in the year.
Lt. I. V. Reed to A. G., Aug. 3, 1859, ibid., pp. 323-325.
Steck to Collins, Aug. 12, 1859, op. cit., p. 713.
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"While the military was awaiting instructions, Steck
made further efforts to forestall punitive action against the
western bands. On October 29 he gave presents to 800
Indians assembled in the Burro Mountains. He then met
400 of the Chiricahuas on the San Simon, where, despite the
military's criticism of his treating with perfidious Indians,
he again exacted Cochise's promise to refrain from hostilities. After concluding that the Chiricahuas should be
united with the Mimbrefios,78 he counciled an assemblage
of 2,500 others, mostly Coyoteros, at Pueblo Viejo, near the
present Safford, Arizona. Their advanced state of agriculture impressed him so much that he immediately reported
they could be made wholly self-supporting if given tools,
put on a reservation and compelled to remain there. 79 But
the presence of some 200 hostile Pinals gave" him certain
misgivings regarding the whole situation. Indeed, he decided the available military force in the territory was insufficient to overawe the 2,500 Indians found north of the Gila.
He therefore asked that the commanding general be told
"of the situation with a view to the establishment of a strong
post in the region. Yet he advised against any extended
scouts, reasoning that they would merely result in terrible
retaliations against the settlements. 8o
The department commander Colonel T. T. Fauntleroy
took a more aggressive view; consequently, Colonel I. V.
Reeve from his depot on the San Pedro in late November,
pushed with nearly 200 men into the Pinal country. He
chased the Indians for 350 miles, lost most of his mounts,
and upon his return to his base, reported that troops to
operate successfully against hostiles needed to be stationed
directly in the Indian country rather than out. 81
78. "Steck to Collins, Nov. 25, 1859, I. 0., N. Me",., C 288.
"79. Ibid.
80. Steck to Collins, Nov. 30, 1859, ibid. In the earlier files a bundle of letters
was often given a single file number.
81. Reeve to Lt. J. D. Wilkins, Nov. 27, 1859, 36 Cong., 1 sess. H. E. D. no. 69,
p.

19-22.

Disregarding the fact that Reeve killed eight and captured tweni;y-three of the
Pinals as well as 111 of their animals, Colonel Fauntleroy showed his ignorance of the
problem by branding Reeve's expedition an "entire and utter failure." Ibid., PP. 24-26~
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Reeve's expedition .apparently ended all official contact with the Apaches'for several months. 82 In the following
September, however, Superintendent Collins without stating how, and without any consideration of the frontiersmen's attitude, suddenly presented Commissioner Greenwood
with an idealistic program that would end all the Apache
troubles by the reduction of the various bands to the Pueblo
system. 83 What might have followed the proposal can only
be conjectured, but immediate developments in the Chir:icahua country near Apache Pass, madeit obvious that Collins
was visionary.
Cochise and his tribe at this time lived near the pass
where, in the most friendly manner he fulfilled a wood contract held with a Mr. Wallace, the Butterfield Stage Line
agent. He also afforded the stages operating through the
region complete protection. 84 . Everything was harmonious
until in October when troops from Fort Buchanan came to
the pass on the hunt fora band of raiders who had been
marauding on the Sonoita. Although the culprits were
probably Pinals, Lieutenant G. N. Bascom in command,
treacherously arrested Cochise arid four of his leading men. 85
Cochise soon made his escape and wishing to guarantee the
lives of his men, captured Wallace and two other whites
whom he held as hostages. When Bascom refused a proposal of. exchange, Cochise immediately killed his prisoners;
whereupon, Bascom retaliated by hanging the Indian captives. 86
Cochise then exacted terrible revenge along the Over82. The approach of the Civil War evidently stopped most ·of th€ federal activity.
Not a single letter from Dr. Steck was found in the 1860 file.
83. Collins to Greenwood, Sept. 24, 1860, 36 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. I, vol. i,
p. 385.
.
84. Wellman, Death in the Desert, pp. 59-60; Clum, Apache Agent, pp. 33-34.
85. Higgins says the Indians had eaten the animals stolen, but that Cochise agreed
to replace them with animals to be gotten from Mexico. N. S. Higgins, ms. no. 180,
Bur.
Ethnology, p. 21.
86. Poston to C. E. Cooley, May 17, 1866, I. 0., P 132; Accounts of this episode
vary greatly. Wellman, ap. cit., p. 60 et seq., refers to Gen. B. J. D. Irvin's article
"The Apache Pass Fight" in The Infantry Journal, April, 1928. Lockwood, op. cit.,
Pp. 161-163, also refers to Irvi~'s article. See Farish, vol. ii, p. 30 et seq.

of

FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES

353

land Route,87 and late in the year Commissioner- C. E. Mix
sent Special Agent M. T. McMahon to study the situation.
McMahon was a realist, seeing at a glance that the only
solution to the problem lay in the control of all the Apaches
rather than in the Chiricahuas alone. He therefore recommended their severe punishment, and, as an added link in
the cordon of protection along the Apache frontier, the
location of a new post at the great bend of the Gila.88
The outbreak of the Civil War and the withdrawal of
all troops from the Apache country 89 prevented any trial of
the plan; indeed, the ingress of Confederate troops in 18611862, and their elimination of the few federal Indian officials, left the savages unrestrained in ravishing the settlements. 90 With the exception of Tucson which simk to a
mere village of 200 people, every enterprise or town in Arizona was either abandoned or completely destroyed. 91
Conditions became equally chaotic in southern New
Mexico. After killing most of the isolated settlers, Mangas
Coloradas in September made a concentrated attack on
Pinos Altos. Although he failed to take the town, his further
killings and devastations soon_ forced the abandonment of
the Mimbres Valley settlements. With affairs thus obviously
beyond the control of the regular officials, Superintendent
Collins asked for federal military controI.92
Early in 1862 the government decided to reassert its
authority in the region, and a California regimen~the
California Volunteers-commanded by General J. H. Carleton, was ordered to the Rio Grande. 93 No difficulties were
87. Within sixty days 150 Americans had been killed. Poston to Cooley, May 17,
Farish says "Bascom's stupidity" probably cost 5000 American lives and
several hundred thousand dollars worth of property. Farish, vol. ii, PP. 32-33.
88. McMahon to Mix, Dec. 15, 1860, I. D., M416.
89. Lockwood, op. cit., p. 86.
90. Collins to W. P. Dole, Oct. 8, 1861, 37 C:ong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. I, vol. i,
pp. 732-733; Steck to Dole, Aug. I, 1863, 1. 0., S 129.
91. Cozzens, The Marvellous Country, p. 167; Hamilton, Resources, p. 23.
92. Collins to C. B. Smith, Nov. 27, 1861, 37 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. I, vol. i,
p.636.
93. Capt. G. H. Pettis, The California Column, (Santa Fe, 1908), PP. 1-45;
Arizona Historical Review, vol. i, p. 88.
1866, op. cit.
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encountered until certain advance contingents under Captains Thomas Roberts and John C. Cremony reached Apache
Pass, but here to their surprise, they were forced to fight
Cochise and Mangas Coloradas a severe fight before the pass
could be negotiated. 94 With its strategical importance thus
demonstrated General Carleton upon his arival a few days
later, made the possession of the pass permanent by establishing Fort Bowie at its base. 95 He then moved on unmolested to Santa Fe, where he issued orders inaugurating a
war of extermination against the Apaches. 96
At this juncture Commissioner W. P. Dole insisted that
the scarcity of game necessitated depredations on the part
of the Apaches and that for this reason Carleton's policy was
unwise. He suggested as an .alternative, a reservation, subsistence and instruction. 97 Nevertheless, the general showed
his determination to carry his policy through by in~esting
the Pinos Altos region with troops centered at a new post
called Fort West. The troops then struck with vigor, killing
Mangas Coloradas 98 and a great number of his braves during the next few weeks. By 1864 the Mimbrefio was reduced
to one of the-least formidable among the Apache bands. 99
Naturally, sharp opposition developed against a continuation of Carleton's ruthless measures. Humanitarians
in arguing for treaties insisted that if depredation claims
were paid out of annual funds that would be allowed the
band, a great saving would result in the annual expenditure of $7,500,000 required for maintenance of the military
in New Mexico. They even argued that by 'paying each In94; Cremony, Life among the Apaches, 158-166. Mangas Coloradas received a
dangerous wound during the fight. See Wellman, op. cit., pp. 79·80.
95. Executive Message of Acting Gov. W. F. Arny, Dec. 2, 1862, I. 0., New Mex.,
K 7.
96. Carleton to Col. J. R. West, Oct. 11, 1862, 39 Cong., 2 sess., S. R. no. 156,
p. 99. This valuable document contains all the important correspondence on Indian
affairs found in the RebeUion Records. It will be cited hereafter as S. R. no. 156.
97. Dole to Smith, Nov. 26, 1862, 37 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, pp.
188-189.
98. For an extended account of the chief's work, see Cremony, op. cit., PP. 176
et seq.
99. Carleton to S. J. Jones, April 27, 1862, Sc R. no. 156, p. 109.
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dian a considerable sum each year, the annual military
expense could be halved. 100 And when the proponents of
extermination contrasted Carleton's work with that of Steck
in a light highly favorable to Carleton, Steck and his friends
insisted that at one-twentieth of the military cost they could
achieve results far more fundamental to the permanent·
peace of the territory.101
But the extermination policy was to receive no check,
for the discovery of gold deposits at a point soon to be known
as Prescott, and the creation of Arizona territory in February, 1863, created further need for aggressive action against
the Apaches.I° 2 A rush of several thousand miners and
ranchers to the new diggings led to the location of Fort Whipple in the Chino Valley on December 23. 103 Major Edward
Willis, the commandant, immediately made a peacable agreement with a local band of three hundred Apaches who lived
to the northeast. Unfortunately, he had already warned the
approaching territorial officers of Indian dangers; therefore, when they inadvertently met the peacable band a few
days later, their escort made an attack and slew twenty of
the bewildered savages. This act of treachery put all the
bands of central Arizona on the warpath. 104
Charles D. Poston, the new superintendent of Indian
affairs, called ·at once for added protection,105 and J. Ross
Browne, a special official of the Department of the Interior, in
pointing out that the 150 soldiers at Tucson were insufficient
to protect their horses, prophetically estimated that it would
require 3,000 men to protect the immigration that would
flow to the gold region. 106 The first territorial legislative
assembly went even further in support of the extermination
100. J. G. Knapp to Comm., Jan. 24, 1863, 1. 0., New Mex., K. 11.
101. Steck to Dole, Sept. 19, 1863, 38 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D .. no. ·1, vol. iii, p.
220.
102. Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, p. 150.
103. S. R. no. 156, p. 136 et seq. In May, 1864, the post as well as the scat of
g'overnment was moved several miles south to the present location of Prescott.
104. FaNh, vol. iii, PP.
Poston to Dole, Dec.
1. 0., Ariz. Mise.
Browne to Dole, Dec.
Cong.,
sess., H. E. D. ·no.
vol. v, p.

308.

105.
106.

45-46.
31, 1863,
27, 1863,·38
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policy by declaring that "relentless and unchangeable" war
would be necessary until the savages were reduced or forced
on a reservation. 107
The white occupation was indeed threatened within a
few weeks. Ranches were swept bare of stock, miners were
killed at their work, and the Indians were so numerous and
dangerous that the region was destitute of transportation.
Workmen erecting buildings in Prescott went armed and no
one could go beyond the town limits in safety. In March a
band of Tontos raided up the Hassayampa River tO,Weaver,
where they killed seven persons including two of the most
prominent citizens.108
Frontier spirit now reached the exploding point, and
King S. Woolsey, a prominent rancher, organized and led a
punitive expedition of sixty whites and' sixty Pimas and
Maricopas into the hostiles' haunts. After arranging a
council at Bloody Tanks near the present Miami, Arizona,
he treacherously murdered twenty-four of the savages.l°9
Conditions were equally bad in the southern part of the
territory. Near ,Tubac Colonel Sam -Butterworth and a
party of mining engineers after losing two of their number
were forced to stop their field work. The military at Fort
Lowell was too weak to gIve protection, and further killings
, and devastations practically drove all enterprise from the
region. Somewhatbaffied, Poston turned to Washington for
aid. In his request for more troops he also asked for military concert between the departments, pointing out that "It
is almost equal to going in a foreign country to pass one
military department to another." He suggested that 3,0005,000 cavalrymen would be needed to reduce the hostilities;110
On February 20 Governor Goodwin asked permission
of the War Department to raise a regiment of volunteer in107. Journal of First Legislative AS8embly, p. 43.
108. Farish, vol. iii, pp. 256-257.
109. Rumor has it that Woolsey gave the Indians a feast of poisoned pinolewhence the name "Pinole Treaty" for the fight. See McClintock, vol. i, p. 186 for
details.
Poston to Dole, Jan. 18, 1864, I. 0;, p. 141.

110.
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fantry. Permission was granted, but the authority was not
exercised until June, 1865. 111
•
In the meantime the Apaches practically invested Prescott. Their scouts, unknown to the whites, watched the
movements of travellers so closely that it was almost suicide
for a small party to venture in any direction. R. C. McCormick, secretary of the territory and former journalist from
New York, attempted to get more troops and wrote Poston
that the sentiment at Prescott was for "utter extermination
of the savages." 112 Poston, instead of taking up his duties
at Prescott, remained at Tucson haggling over Indian traderships. He worked out no constructive program, but he
wanted to take a delegation of chiefs to Washington. This
would be a much cheaper way to impress them with "the
power and resources of the Government," he believed, "than
by engaging in a long Indian war." 113
But the frontiersmen of Arizona preferred direct action,
and late in March they again organized under Colonel Woolsey. Proceeding into the edge of the Tonto Basin, they fell
upon a large village of sixty wickiups composed mainly of
squaws, children, and old men. The entire village was
wiped out, and Carleton's statement of fourteen killed probably referred to the warriors alone,114
For several months Carleton had expended most of his
energy against the Navajos and Mescaleros, trying to confine them to the Bosque Redondo in Eastern New Mexico.ll5
He also continued minor operations against the remaining
Mimbres and Mogollons. The new gold fields were not forgotten, however, and he contemplated a new post to be
known as Fort Goodwin on the Gila, north of Fort Bowie.
To the people of Arizona he sent word that troops would
soon be sent not to make "a little march out and back again,"
111. See letter of Gen. J. B. Fry to Gov. of Ariz., April 16, 1864, in Farish, vol.
iv, pp. 94-97.
112. McCormick to Poston, Mar. 3, 1864, I. 0., Ariz. Misc.
113. Poston to Dole, Mar. 14, 1864, I. 0., P 172.
114. S. R. no. 156, p. 260.
115. Frank D. Reeve, "Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880," in
N. M. HIST. REV., xiii (Jan. 1938), chap. iii.
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but to wage a serious war against the Apaches. ll6 He sought
the cooperation of the governors of Sonora and Chihuahua,
extending to them the privilege of crossing into his department,and he requested them to put a large force in the field
about June 1 for a three months campaign. ll7 A similar
plea for aid and cooperation was sent to Governor Goodwin
in which he declared that if the Apaches were not subjugated
by Christmas, a war of twenty years length could be anticipated. 1l8
In fact General Carleton probably wishing to learn the
fighting methods of the Western Apaches, had already sent
Captain.J. H. Whitlock on a campaign along the upper Gila.
Thirty-four Indians killed, many others wounded and fortyfive head of stock captured, indicated that the hostiles could
be worsted. Colonels E. A; Rigg and H. H. Davis, late in
/' May, penetrated into the same region to choose the site for
the new post. They selected a spot near the Gila about six
miles from the present Fort Thomas, Arizona, and then
campaigned until they had killed forty-nine more Indians. ll9
Despite these early prospects of success Carleton's proposed campaign failed to materialize. The records give no
clue, but it is possible that-the frontiersmen's unwillingness
to volunteer for the campaign cooled the general's ardor. 12O
Officials in the territory now began to realize the magnitude of the Indian problem. The surveyor-general informed his superior that the Apaches could muster 1,800
warriors. l21 John C. Dunn in charge of the Yavapai at Poston's direction, saw that the whites were associating these
friendly Indians with the hostile bands to the east. He predicted that white encroachment would soon force the Indians
into hostility along the trails from the Colorado River to
Carleton to Col. N. H. Davis, April I, 1864, S. R. no. 156, pp. 171-172.
Carleton to Don Ygnacio Pesquira and Don Louis Terrazas, April 20, 1864.
177-178.
Carleton to Goodwin, April 20, 1864, ibid., p. 179.
119. S. R. no. 156, pp. 184, 260.
120. Journals of First Legislative Assembly, p. 132.
121. Levi Bashford to J. M. Edmunds, July 4, 1864, 38 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D.
no. I, vol. v, p. 110.

116.
117.
ibid., pp.
118.
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Prescott. When the situation became desperate in early
August, he went to Date Creek, where with considerable success he counseled the Yavapai to go to the Yuma Reservation
on the Coloradop2
Dunn's efforts deterred the Prescott frontiersmen from
waging immediate war on the Yavapai; instead, ninety of
them pushed into eastern Arizona on a combined gold-hunting and Indian-fighting expedition. No Indians were killed,
but the expedition in moving through a country hitherto
unexplored, gained a great deal of new geographical information. More important, the expedition not only proved
that the number of Apaches was gr~atly exaggerated, but it
also demonstrated that their remote haunts could be
reached. 123
The defensive strength of the territory suffered sharply
during the fall by the mustering out of a considerable number of the California Volunteers. This checked active scouting, but skeletal forces were maintained at the posts. With
slight prospects of reenforcements and with hostility spreading to formerly peaceable bands, Carleton decided that 2,000
troops would be required to subjugate the aroused
Apaches. 124
Carleton was soon relieved of the defense of Arizona,
however, for the territory was shifted in January, 1865, to
the Department of the Pacific. Unfortunately, this move discouraged and enervated the few remaining commands, and
thus the savages were left practically unrestrained. Early
in February they committed numerous killings and robberies in southeastern Arizona, and then they attacked the
small group of videttes stationed at Fort Buchanan, drove
122. Dunn to Dole, Aug. 25, 1864, 1. 0., D 563.
Pauline Weaver, an old mountain man and friend of the Yavapai, did much con..
ciliatory work. Weaver to Poston, Oct. 31, 1864, 1. 0., P 278.
123. Woolsey to Goodwin, Aug. 28, 1864 in Farish, vol. iii, p. 258 ·et seq.
124. Carleton to Goodwin, Oct. 13, 1864, A. G. 0., L. B. no. 16.
The territorial legislature took Carleton's hint and began to think of self-help,
provided the federal government would furnish the money and arms. They also demanded that Arizona be shifted to the Department of the Pacific. 38 Cong., 2 sess.,
H. M. D. no. 18.
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them out and actually took the post and its impedimenta.125
West of Prescott the whites gave the Yavapais and
Apache..lYumas no chance to be peaceable. Although various
bands of them worked on the roads and herded stock for
the settlers, a command from Fort Whipple, early in January, wantonly attacked and killed twenty-eight men, women,
and children of Chief Hosekma's band, including the friendly
chief himself. The Indians still hoped for peace, but a month
later an intoxicated settler killed Chief Amasa. Killing of
whites then became general, and the Indians soon, cut off
all communication to the Colorado. By June it appeared that
central Arizona and C!.mtiguous parts would have to be
abandoned. 126
The territorial officers now tried to raise a force. Governor Goodwin and Colonel Woolsey were sent as special
commissioners to San Francisco to negotiate a loan, but they
found the-bankers unresponsive. While in San Francisco
they presented the plight of affairs to the department commander, General Irvin McDowell. He agreed to send reenforcements at once and promised to make Arizona a separate military district. 127
General McDowell moved rapidly, and in May General
J. S. Mason arrived in Arizona with 1,000 troops. He came
home too soon, for even the friendly tribes of the Colorado
River were ready to start war,128 With the troops came elaborate instructions. The territory was to be divided into a
number of sub-districts in which the commander of each
was to be absolute in all matters of active field operations.
"Activity and energy" was demandE:)d and a careful study
of the tribes was ordered. 129
The new superintendent, G. W. Leihy, 130 determined to
continue Poston's plan of colonizing the friendly Indians on
125.
126.

M. O. Davidson to Dole, Feb. 11, 1865, 1. 0., D 672.
Dunn to Dole, May 23, 1865, 1. 0., D 736.
127. Journals of the Second Legislative Assembly, p. 41.
128. Davidson to Dole, Aug. 12, 1865, 1. 0., D 770.
129. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. 'E. D. no. I, vol. ii, pp. 91-92.
130. Leiby's appointment followed Poston's election as delegate to Congress. Dole
to Leiby, April 1, 1865, I. 0., Ariz., Misc.
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the Colorado and of leaving the hostile bands to the military and frontiersmen. l3l He therefore hastened to Prescott
to facilitate cooperation with Mason. 132 The Indian Office
also became cooperative and instructed Leihy to give the
military full control in times of hostilities. Even in the case
of supply issues, he was to be governed solely by military
recommendations. 133
General Mason decided upon immediate action. He
directed Colonel C. H. Lewis to clear the hostiles from a
newly created district south of the Gila and east of the Pima
Villages. But Lewis failed to take action, and the situation
rapidly grew worse. Troops from Fort Bowie, more in
accord with the spirit of instructions, campaigned extensively; nevertheless the hostiles remained unreduced. 134
Mason accompanied by Goodwin, meanwhile, proceeded
to Fort Bowie. He attempted to arrange a council with the
Indians, but as they had experienced the violation of five
flags of truce during the past year none could be gotten in.
He then worked out a plan of campaign whereby the savages
were to be wiped out by incessant attacks throughout the
territory. Those who would surrender, however, were to be
placed on certain designated reserves, where they were to
receive rations and protection.135
The most important reserve thus designated was
near Fort Goodwin. Superintendent Leihy was enthusiastic about its location and he predicted that with liberal
appropriations the experiment would prove very successful. 136 The territorial politicians also become enthusiastic,
131.
objection
April 12.
132.
690.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Poston wrote, uThe Apache richly deserve extermination . . . I have no
to seeing them burnt alive, men, women and children." Poston to 'Leiby,
1865. ibid.
Leihy to Comm., Oct. 18, 1865, 39 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, p.

Comm. to Leihy, July 27, 1865, I. 0., Ariz. Misc.
Farish, vol. iv. Pp. 124-127.
Ibid.
Leihy to Corom., Oct. 18, 1865, op. cit.

o

362

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

and to attract immigration gave out propaganda that the
Apache troubles were practically ended. 137
But the widespread hostility in central Arizona during
the summer of 1865 proved the falsity of their statements.
- Attacks were of hourly occurrence around Prescott, and the
necessity for defence made it practically impossible for the
territorial judge to keep his jurors in the box. 138 Killings_
and raids attributed to- the Pinals and Tontos necessitated
greater permanent protection to the Salt River Valley; consequently, General McDowell ordered the establishment of a
five-company post near the junction of the Salt and Verde
rivers. This was done on September 7 by Colonel C. E. Bennett who named the post Fort McDowell. 139 The choice of
location was a most sagacious one, for in addition to its strategicalvalue, it forced the hostiles when raiding to pass
through the country of their dangerous enemies, the Pim-as
and Maricopas.
General Mason now decided upon a winter campaign.
He planned to make Verde the frontier line from which all
expeditions were to penetrate eastward. Leihy supported
the plan and reported that the future of the territory- depended upon the outcome of the war. But Leihy was a realist and he saw that the contempt the average settler had for
the Indians made a permanent peace almost a chimera. Besides, he realized that the wide searches the Indians were
forced to make for indigenous foods naturally led to clashes
. with the whitesYo
He therefore eagerly awaited an opportunity to remove
those bands in closest proximityto the settlements of central
137. McCormick to New York Times, June I, 1865, quoted by Farish, vol. iv,
p.22.
Military need of grain was the raison d'etre of the new settlements established
early in 1865 in the Verde, Williamson's, Kirkland, People's and Skull valleys. See
Farish, vol. iv, p. 215 et seq. for details. Camp Lincoln, established in Jan., 1866,
(name changed to Camp Verde, Nov. 23, 1868) commanded the upper Verde Valley.
T. H. S. Hammersley, ed., Complete Army Register of the United States, 1779-1879,
(Wash., 1881), p. 361.
138. Farish, vol. iii, pp. 246-247.
139. Hammersley, op. cit., p. 220.
140. Leihy to Comm., Oct. 18, 1865, op. cit., p. 691.
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Arizona. His chance came in October when war broke out
among the widely divergent tribes up and down the Colorado. Enlisting the aid of Chief Iretaba of the Mohaves and
Chief Cuesucama of the Yavap'ai, he induced about 800 of
the semi-hostile Yavapai allies of the Mohaves to move to
the Colorado River Reservation. This success not only gave
needed relief to Mason's troops, but in causing commerce to
start again, it prevented the white abandonment of much of
western Arizona. 141
Mason's troops soon showed unusual vigor, for General
McDowell announced he plallned a winter inspection of the
district of Arizona. A strong command in October successfully defended the Verde settlements against .two hundred
raiders and killed five of them. Almost simultaneously Cochise's band was struck in the Chiricahua Mountains and
rendered hors de combat for the rest of the winter. 142 Fort
McDowell trops campaigned actively along the lower Verde,
but the ubiquitous hostiles were too elusive to be decimated. 143
Unfortunately, the vigor of the troops west of Prescott
was retarded by a lack of cooperation on the part of the
citizens ;144 and in the Fort Goodwin area, Major James Gorman's interest in graft prevented any effective blows. 145 ,
General Mason in December, promulgated a new, policy for the Yavapai and other tribes of western Arizona by
establishing a north and south peace line midway between
Prescott and the Colorado. West of the line the Indians
were to be considered peaceable; those to the east at war.
141. Ibid,. p. 687.
142. Lt. Antonio Abeyetea to Mai. H. M. Benson, Oct. 25, 1865, A. G. 0., 632;
Maj. James Gorman to A. A. G., Dec. 9, 1865, ibid.
143. Lt. J. D. Walker to Bennett, Dec. 12, 1865, ibid.
144. In one typical case, a packtrain of fifty animals belonging to one Wormster
was attacked by fifty Indians. The packsters gave the escort under Captain A. S.
Grant no aid whatever. Wormster quickly placed his loss at $800, but when he saw
that the troops would be successful in recovering almost all of his packs, he immediately raised his estimation of losses to $1500. Grant to Col. Green, Dec. 25, 1865, ibid.
145. Gorman made a treaty with Chief Francisco, who agreed not to molest the
region near the post. With Gorman's rations his band raided and murdered to the Rio
Grande. They then returned with the stock of their victims, finding the post sutler
and'some of the officers eager buyers. Frank and B. C. Morehouse to M. O. Davidson,
Oct. 30, 1865, I. 0., D 917.
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If the whites could be prevented from overt acts of hostility,
he looked upon the new policy as a complete solution for the
problem. 146
The New Mexican authorities gave little attention in
1865 to the Western Apaches left to their control. In March
General Carleton decided the Mimbreiios should be established at the Bosque Redondo, and for that purpose he sent
Captain N. H. Davis to interview them. Davis counseled
with Victorio and his sub-chiefs at Pinos Altos on April 20,
where he found them destitute, tired of war and ready to
send an examining committee to the Bosque. A J)oint of rendezvous for the start was selected, but no delegation appeared. Davis then closed all possibilities of success by
ordering his' men to kill every male Indian found. In reporting to Carleton he set forth that a true policy toward the
"rattlesnakes" would be one of "unrelenting. war." 147
During 1865 the officials of the Department of the Interior showed far less interest in the Apaches than either
the Arizona or New Mexico military. In fact; the commissioner late in 1864 stated that Apache relations were governed by the course of events rather than by the adoption of
a policy.148 No one inthe department apparently understood
the problem, and Leihy's suggestion that a bribe of $300$500 each, would keep the chiefs peacable,149 proved that
men in the field had no constructive views. Commissioner
Cooley reported that the Apache troubles were due to a lack
of congressional appropriations for subsistence,15o but more
appropriately, he could have said that a lack of funds deterred the formulation of a constructive Apache policy.

146. General Order no. 15, Dec. 18. 1865, I. 0;, L 48. The Army War College has
a vast collection of military orders covering the Indian wars. Many of the orders also
accompanied documents sent to the Interior and War Departments. The Old Records
Division of the Adjutant General's Office has many files of orders, but these are rather
inacessible.
147. Davis toA. A. G., May 3, 1865, S. R. no. 156, pp. 304-307.
148. Dole to J. P. Usher, Nov. 15, 1864, 38 Cong., 2 seSB., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. v,
I)'

165.
149.
150.

Leihy to D. N; Cooley, Dec. 1, 1865, I. 0., L 4.
Cooley to Harlan, Dec. 20, 1865, R. B. no. 15, p.

20.
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Whatever other conclusions may be drawn regarding the
Apaches at this point, it is certain that a definite policy for
their control remained to be charted.
(To be continued)

